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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Acquiring Firm Long-term Performance and Governance Characteristics. (May 2004) 
Jonathan Paul Breazeale, B.S., United States Military Academy; 
M.B.A., Millsaps College 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. L. Paige Fields 
 
 I examine the market reaction to merger announcements and the long-term 
post-merger stock price performance of newly merged firms.  For a sample of 484 
acquiring firms completing mergers between 1993 and 2000, the average value-
weighted abnormal announcement date return (market-adjusted) is a statistically 
significant -1.02%.  On average, this reaction is more negative for firms with “good 
governance.”  Specifically, a governance index comprised of three governance variables 
is significantly negative in a multivariate regression of announcement date abnormal 
returns.  Comp is the percentage of CEO salary consisting of equity incentives 
(including stock options and restricted stock grants), InsideOwn is the percentage of the 
firm owned by officers and directors, and InstOwn is the percentage of the firm owned 
by large outside block shareholders.  Value-weighted calendar-time portfolios 
consisting of the full sample of acquirers exhibit  significant abnormal returns of 9.12%, 
33.84% and 55.8% for the 12, 36 and 60 months following the merger, respectively.  This 
overperformance is limited to the value-weighted portfolios.  There is calendar-time 
evidence of abnormal performance for some subsamples on a risk adjusted basis. 
However, when compared to a control group, abnormal performance is limited to large 
glamour acquirers on a 12-month horizon, large cash acquirers on a 36 and 60-month 
horizon, and small focusing acquirers on a 60-month horizon.  Multivariate analysis of 
long-run returns reveals that use of equity and corporate diversification are associated 
with lower post-merger performance.  With regard to governance and long-run stock 
returns, there is also evidence that suggests higher levels of incentive compensation for 
CEOs is associated with more successful merger transactions for long-term investors. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Does governance matter?  In other words, does the existence of a particular 
governance structure have an impact on the value of the firm?  If so, one would expect 
firms with better governance to be those who make decisions that maximize firm value.  
Specifically, firms with good governance should make better investment, financing, 
payout and hedging decisions than firms with poor governance.  In fact, the corporate 
finance function that has received a great deal of attention in the popular press recently 
has been the financial reporting function.  Congress and U.S. stock exchanges are so 
certain that poor governance has been the root of poor financial reporting that they 
have enacted drastic legislation and regulations aimed at creating better governance 
structures at publicly traded companies.  For instance, the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 
now requires that CEOs and CFOs issue certification statements to accompany financial 
statements and that boards of directors include “financially-literate members” with no 
financial ties to public accounting firms.  As of November 4, 2003, the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) has implemented a new 18-page document of listing standards for 
corporate governance of member firms.  On the whole, there exists a general feeling 
that something is awry in the current governance structures of public U.S. firms. 
This paper examines the impact of governance on the firm’s investment 
decision.  Through that decision, firm managers are able to create value by accepting 
positive net present value (NPV) projects and rejecting negative NPV projects.  
Similarly, they have the potential to destroy firm value by accepting negative NPV 
projects (overinvesting) and rejecting positive NPV projects (underinvesting).  While 
the firm’s decision to reject a project is unobservable, we are able to see at least a 
portion of their investment policy through projects they accept.  Perhaps the largest and 
most visible project a firm can undertake is the decision to purchase another company. 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style and format of the Journal of Financial Economics. 
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Why study the investment decision?  Modigliani and Miller (1958) suggest that, 
in a world without frictions, there is no difference between an equity and debt claim on 
the firm’s cash flows.  Therefore, in such an economy, the financing decision adds no 
value and is therefore of no concern to managers.  While they do not expect this 
solution (or lack thereof) to hold in reality, they do suggest that the most feasible way in 
which to add value to a company is through its investments and its increase in 
operating cash flows.  Value added via fancy financing schemes should be small by 
comparison.   
The long-term post-merger return performance of newly merged firms has 
garnered a great deal of attention in the literature of financial economics.  Critics of 
market efficiency provide evidence that merger transactions, on average, are followed 
by significant negative abnormal drift in the returns of the newly formed companies 
over the subsequent one to five year periods.  For example, Asquith (1983) finds a 
significant cumulative excess return of -7.2% for merged firms over the 240 trading days 
following the merger.  Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) report a significant -10.26% 
abnormal return over the subsequent 60 months.  Such researchers herald this finding 
as inconsistent with the notion that the market responds quickly and fully to the arrival 
of the information contained in merger transactions.  Proponents of market efficiency 
argue that the evidence supporting negative post-merger drift is plagued with errors.  
For example, Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) argue that such errors 
include use of an inappropriate benchmark (and the accompanying bad model 
problem), inappropriate distributional assumptions of test statistics and the 
inappropriate assumption of independence of observations.  Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000) correct for these biases, and the negative drift they report is not significantly 
different from zero.  As of yet, the issue of negative versus zero post-merger return drift 
is unresolved.   
In contrast to the argument of whether long-term post-merger drift is 
significantly different from zero, the purpose of this paper is to use the recent advances 
in performance measurement to develop a clearer picture of the determinants of the 
cross-sectional dispersion of long-term post-merger returns in a multivariate 
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framework.  In so far as current methodologies appropriately account for all relevant 
risk, this paper asks what deal or firm characteristics contribute to the success or failure 
of a merger for a long-term investor.   
The idea of examining the sources of the economic gains to mergers (with 
emphasis on long-term shareholders) is not new.  In a long horizon study of merger 
waves, Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) remark:   
 
What are the long-term effects of mergers, and what makes some 
successful and others not?  We hope that over the next decade merger 
research will move beyond the basic issue of measuring and assigning 
gains and losses to tackle the more fundamental question of how mergers 
actually create or destroy value. (p. 104) 
 
Researchers have begun to answer their call.  Several factors have been shown to 
influence long-term post-merger returns; however, frequently such evidence is 
contradicted in other studies.  For example, Loughran and Vijh (1997) and Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000) find that acquirers using cash significantly outperform stock offers.  
Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991) report no significant difference between the two 
groups of acquirers.  Megginson, Morgan, and Nail (2003) suggest that the most 
important determinant of long-term post-merger return performance is whether or not 
the merger is diversifying in nature.  They report that a 9.0% loss in shareholder wealth 
is observed for each 10% decrease in corporate focus (as measured by a continuous 
Herfindahl Index measure).  Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) report that non-
conglomerate mergers actually underperform mergers that are diversifying in nature.  
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) report that “value” acquirers (those with a high book-to-
market equity ratio) outperform “glamour” acquirers (those with a low book-to-market 
equity ratio) over a three-year period following merger completion.  Megginson, 
Morgan and Nail (2003) find no significant difference between glamour and value 
acquirers.  In sum, numerous contradictions exist among empirical studies of long-term 
post-merger returns.  Many of the discrepancies in the existing studies may be 
explained by different sample periods, but the methodologies employed are as different 
in number as the number of the studies themselves.  Namely, authors have chosen both 
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different return metrics and different benchmarks for expected returns.  In studies of 
long-term performance, the appropriate choice of both is critical.  Unfortunately, no 
choice is perfect or even beyond the reach of deserved criticism.  Without a perfect 
model of the return generating process, this debate will continue indefinitely. 
In addition to examining determinants that have received a great deal of 
attention in the long-term performance literature, I also incorporate internal governance 
mechanisms of acquiring firms.1  The purpose of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms is to more closely align the competing self-interests of shareholders and 
managers, thereby reducing the agency costs associated with the separation of 
ownership and control.  If corporate governance mechanisms are successful in 
mitigating agency costs, then we should observe firms making sound investment 
decisions that are in the best interests of shareholders.  The central hypothesis of this 
paper is that firms with good internal governance make better acquisitions because of 
decreased agency costs between managers and shareholders.   
Typically, studies of corporate governance can be categorized as one of two 
types.  The first type, like this study, examines the effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanisms on specific decisions made by the firm.  For example, 
Weisbach (1988) demonstrates that firms with a majority of outside directors are more 
likely to remove an ineffective CEO.  Byrd and Hickman (1992) report that for a sample 
of tender offers, bidding firms with at least fifty-percent non-affiliated board 
representation have significantly higher announcement-date abnormal returns than do 
bidders with insider dominated boards.  While an analysis of this type sheds light on 
the effectiveness of corporate governance on the decision in question, it does not 
necessarily follow that firms with good governance will always make decisions that 
make shareholders better off.  Also, one cannot assume that evidence in support of 
effective governance on one particular decision implies a positive impact on overall 
                                                 
1 This paper uses the conventions of Byrd, Parrino and Pritsch (1998) in classifying governance mechanisms 
as either internal or external to the firm.  Internal governance mechanisms include debt, dividends, 
managerial stock ownership, managerial compensation, board structure, board ownership, and large 
outside shareholders.  External mechanisms include the market for corporate control and the market for 
managerial labor. 
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firm value or performance.  However, the advantage of such a study is the tractability 
of data and the ease of interpretation with regard to the particular decision in question. 
The second type of corporate governance study involves a regression of some 
measure of overall firm value or performance on multiple governance variables.  
Assuming that the left-hand side of the specification of interest accurately measures 
firm value or performance, the interpretation of the results of this type of study is more 
informative than the results of the research design described above.  A direct positive or 
negative relation between the governance characteristic and overall firm value is 
observed simply via the coefficient estimates of the explanatory variables.  More recent 
studies have begun to control for the issue of endogeneity which typically plagues 
studies of this type.  For example, it is unclear whether a firm is valued more highly 
because of increased ownership by outside block shareholders or if outside block 
shareholders own shares because the firm is valued highly.  Simultaneous equation 
models are now frequently used to appropriately discern causality.  It also remains 
uncertain whether the measure being used to capture firm value actually performs such 
a role.  Typically, the left-hand side is some variant of Tobin’s Q which arguably 
measures the value added to the firm’s assets from being under the control of present 
management.  Inevitably, this metric is calculated using some form of a market-to-book 
equity ratio (usually industry adjusted) which is not without criticism.  Obvious 
arguments aside, some asset pricing researchers use this same measure to capture 
systematic risk.  Likewise, capital structure researchers frequently argue that market-to-
book equity is a natural proxy for the growth opportunities available to a firm.  
Although seemingly more simple in interpretation, one can see how this alternative 
research design is confounded by its own problems. 
The main contribution of this paper is to show how internal governance 
characteristics influence the cross-sectional dispersion of post-merger returns over a 
long-term horizon.  In order to test the proposition that governance influences merger 
performance, I use a myriad of methodologies.  First, I conduct a standard event study 
for merger announcements and examine whether or not this announcement is different 
for firms with high versus low values of three governance variables.  Comp is defined 
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as the portion of CEO compensation that consists of incentive equity compensation in 
the twelve months prior to the merger announcement, InsideOwn is the percentage of 
outstanding shares owned by officers and directors in the twelve months prior to the 
announcement, and InstOwn is the percentage of the firm held by outside block 
shareholders in the twelve months prior to the announcement.  Next, I conduct a 
multivariate regression of the announcement day returns on the governance 
mechanisms and controls.  I then form equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolios 
in calendar time in a test of market efficiency on a 12 to 60-month horizon.  I also test 
for differences between the alphas of each of the subsamples of interest.  Finally, I 
conduct multivariate regressions of long-run returns on the governance variables and a 
set of controls.  I repeat this process using long-run post-merger returns.  Additionally, 
my analysis of long-run returns uses the calendar-time portfolio methodology 
suggested by Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000). 
For a sample of 484 acquiring firms completing mergers between 1993 and 2000, 
the average value-weighted abnormal announcement date return (market-adjusted) is a 
statistically significant -1.02%.  On average, this reaction is more negative for firms with 
“good governance.”  Specifically, a governance index comprised of three governance 
variables is significantly negative in a multivariate regression of announcement date 
abnormal returns.  Comp is the percentage of CEO salary consisting of equity incentives 
(including stock options and restricted stock grants), InsideOwn is the percentage of the 
firm owned by officers and directors, and InstOwn is the percentage of the firm owned 
by large outside block shareholders.  Value-weighted calendar-time portfolios 
consisting of the full sample of acquirers exhibit  significant abnormal returns of 9.12%, 
33.84% and 55.8% for the 12, 36 and 60 months following the merger, respectively.  This 
overperformance is limited to the value-weighted portfolios.  There is calendar-time 
evidence of abnormal performance for some subsamples on a risk adjusted basis. 
However, when compared to a control group, abnormal performance is limited to large 
glamour acquirers on a 12-month horizon, large cash acquirers on a 36 and 60-month 
horizon, and small focusing acquirers on a 60-month horizon.  There is no univariate 
evidence in calendar-time that any of the three governance measures matters in the 
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long-run.  Multivariate analysis of long-run returns reveals that equity as a method of 
payment and corporate diversification are associated with lower post-merger 
performance.  Unlike the univariate calendar-time results, there is multivariate evidence 
that a high level of incentive compensation for CEOs is associated with more successful 
merger transactions for long-term investors. 
 Chapter II of the paper describes the extant research and applicable literature 
associated with long-run return measurement, the long-run performance of combined 
firms and the relation between internal governance mechanisms and corporate control 
transactions.  Chapter III describes the hypotheses development, data and 
methodologies.  Results are presented in chapter IV, and chapter V concludes. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to use the recent advances in performance 
measurement to develop a clearer picture of the determinants of the cross-sectional 
dispersion of long-term post-merger returns.  As such, in this section, I review the 
evidence regarding measurement of long-run abnormal returns, the extant evidence 
regarding determinants of long-term post-merger abnormal returns and the evidence 
on how the external governance characteristic of the corporate control market interacts 
with internal governance characteristics. 
 
2.2 Measurement of Long-term Abnormal Stock Returns 
The two most popular choices for long-term abnormal return measurement are 
the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR).  
The CAR is calculated by simply adding the abnormal returns for each period of 
measurement (typically a month) to yield an abnormal return measure over a horizon 
of twelve to sixty months.  The BHAR is found by compounding each sub-period return 
into a buy-and-hold measure for the twelve to sixty month period of analysis.  
Mathematically, these two measures are defined as: 
 
(2.1) 
 
 (2.2) 
 
Once a metric has been chosen, the second and most important decision a researcher 
must make in the calculation of long-term abnormal returns is the choice of an 
appropriate benchmark.  Candidates receiving attention thus far have been reference 
portfolios (such as the value-weighted or equal-weighted index of firms maintained by 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) or the twenty-five size and book-to-
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market portfolios of Fama and French (1993)), a set of control firms selected in a manner 
designed to mimic the risk of sample firms, and the application of an asset pricing 
model such as the three factor model of Fama and French (1993) or the four factor 
model of Carhart (1997). 
 Barber and Lyon (1997) argue for the use of the BHAR over the CAR.  They 
demonstrate that the CAR suffers from a measurement bias due to the fact that CARs 
ignore compounding, thereby making them a biased predictor of BHARs.  However, 
the potential inclusion of newly listed firms in the benchmark and not in the sample 
under consideration may cause the mean CAR and mean BHAR to be non-zero.  Both 
the CAR and the BHAR suffer from being positively skewed; however, the BHAR 
suffers from this skewness bias even more drastically than the CAR.  Finally, the BHAR 
suffers from a rebalancing bias when using an equal-weighted benchmark with 
monthly rebalancing.  With such rebalancing, overperforming firms (relative to the 
market) are sold in favor of adding underperforming firms.  Although Barber and Lyon 
(1997) admit that the BHAR suffers from its own problems (and their results 
demonstrate that less problematic inferences may be made from CARs), they prefer its 
use to that of the CAR because they believe that the BHAR more accurately represents 
investor experience.   
Regarding the benchmark of expected returns, Barber and Lyon (1997) argue for 
the use of the control firm approach over the reference portfolio approach or the Fama 
and French (1993) three-factor model.  According to their random samples, CARs 
calculated via the reference portfolio approach exhibit a positively biased statistic, while 
BHARs calculated via the reference portfolio and CARs calculated using the Fama and 
French (1993) three-factor model exhibit negatively biased statistics.  Both BHARs and 
CARs appear to be well-specified when control firms are used, especially when selected 
on the basis of both size and book-to-market.  
 Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) improve upon the Barber and Lyon (1997) 
methodology.  Specifically, they control for the new listing, rebalancing and skewness 
biases discussed above and find that two measures of abnormal returns are well-
specified in random samples.  First, they develop a set of size and book-to-market 
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reference portfolios designed to eliminate the new listing and rebalancing biases.  They 
then calculate and test BHARs of random firms against (1) a bootstrapped distribution 
to adjust for skewness and (2) against the simulated distribution of mean returns using 
pseudo-portfolios as in Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995).   This method 
results in well-specified test statistics in random samples.  While they continue to argue 
that it is not reflective of the returns experienced by actual investors, they also test the 
calendar-time methodology of Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker (1974) that is advocated by 
Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000).  Formation of calendar-time portfolios 
eliminates the cross-sectional dependence of observations and results in well-specified 
test statistics.  The greatest insight of their new findings is that for non-random samples, 
controlling for size and book-to-market does not necessarily result in well-specified 
statistics.  This is the case for both the BHAR and calendar-time methods.  For a non-
random sample of merged firms such as the one studied here, this implies that 
calculation of abnormal returns must be undertaken with great caution.  In fact, Lyon, 
Barber and Tsai (1999) conclude that “analysis of long-run abnormal returns is 
treacherous” (p. 165).  
Fama (1998) argues for the use of CARs.  Any test of market efficiency implicitly 
includes a simultaneous test of the model of expected returns being used in the test.  
This bad model problem is more acute for BHARs which compound the problems 
associated with accurately measuring the expected return.  For a long-horizon study, 
this compounding effect becomes even more problematic.  Fama advocates using a 
firm-specific model, such as the market model, as a potential correction to the bad 
model problem.  Specifically, one estimates the coefficients in a regression of the 
individual stock’s return on the market return and uses the estimated coefficients to 
calculate the abnormal return.  The comparison period approach of Masulis (1980) is 
also suggested as a way to avoid the bad model problem.  However, Fama (1998) 
admits that many corporate news events are preceded by unusual returns as well, 
which makes it difficult to identify a “normal” period in which to estimate model 
parameters.   The alternative is to select an asset pricing model which constrains the 
cross-section of expected returns, but this induces the bad model problem that plagues 
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proper calculation in the first place.  Not only do BHARs suffer more drastically from 
the issue of a bad model, but Fama (1998) argues a formal test of abnormal returns 
“should use the return metric called for by the model invoked to estimate expected 
(normal) returns.” (p. 294).  He suggests that using a compounded return on a horizon 
of up to sixty months is inconsistent with the single (shorter) period assumptions under 
which most asset pricing models were derived.  Monthly returns serve as a more well-
behaved measure of abnormal returns.  For these reasons, he strongly argues for the use 
of CARs. 
 Kothari and Warner (1997) verify the extreme skewness of the BHAR measure in 
their simulation evidence.  They report that tests using an asset pricing model such as 
the Fama and French (1993) three factor model as a benchmark for expected returns 
reject the null of zero abnormal returns too often.  They also report that the use of 
BHARs or of CARs when using this benchmark does not alter inferences; however, their 
analysis of the distributional properties of their estimates supports the necessity of 
adjusting BHARs for extreme skewness.  They recommend the procedure used by 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) where the empirical distribution of the 
abnormal return is generated by one thousand random samples of abnormal returns of 
event firms matched in time with firms of similar size and book-to-market equity 
characteristics. 
  Mitchell and Stafford (2000) echo many of the concerns of Fama (1998).  They 
argue that BHARs are not a superior method of measuring long-term abnormal returns.  
Specifically, BHARs suffer from statistical problems that cannot be solved by the 
bootstrapping procedures previously discussed.  Even if one can properly adjust the 
mean of the distribution of abnormal returns, Mitchell and Stafford argue that the 
distribution is too “thin” because the bootstrapped distribution does not correct for the 
cross-correlation of residuals created by the non-independence of event firms.  
Applying an ad hoc procedure to correct for non-independence, they demonstrate that 
long-term post-event BHARs are not significantly different from zero for samples of 
merged firms, firms executing seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and firms repurchasing 
shares of common equity.  Their preferred solution is described in detail below. 
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2.3 Long-term Post-Merger Abnormal Stock Returns and Their Determinants 
 In a perfect world, one would prefer to compare the return of a merged firm 
with the return of the same firm had it not merged (or alternatively, an identically risky 
non-merging firm).  In order to judge or evaluate post-merger performance, and 
without the ability to observe such returns, researchers are left to determine an 
appropriate benchmark or model of expected returns.  The literature on mergers has 
come a long way in measuring long-term post-merger returns in a manner that controls 
for risk.  Table 1 summarizes the discussion that follows. 
 Mandelker (1974) is the first major study of long-term post-merger stock returns 
to incorporate a large sample with a model that adjusts for risk (and changes in risk).  
The questions Mandelker asks are 1) “Are mergers in fact associated with abnormal 
positive or negative returns?” and 2) “Is the capital market efficient with respect to 
mergers? That is, is information on mergers reflected immediately in the stock prices of 
the merging firms?” (p. 304).  In order to determine abnormal returns to bidders and 
targets, Mandelker employs the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Black (1972) as 
a measure of expected returns that controls for risk.  Using monthly data on his sample 
of 241 NYSE acquirers, Mandelker finds that combined firms display no significant 
cumulative abnormal residuals as many as forty months subsequent to the merger 
completion.  He interprets his findings as consistent with the efficient markets 
hypothesis.  This result is important because prior to his study, the general tenor of 
research on mergers suggested that mergers were followed by significant negative 
abnormal returns (for example, see Hogarty (1970)).  For robustness, Mandelker (1974) 
forms portfolios in calendar-time to control for the non-independence of events.  While 
his method has since been refined, he and Jaffe (1974) are credited with the 
development of this new methodology.  However, the results of his analysis are still 
consistent with the notion that the market incorporates the news of the merger at the 
time of the announcement.  The calendar-time abnormal returns (CTARs) do not tell a 
convincing story one way or another. 
Contrasting the methods of Mandelker (1974), Langetieg (1978) employs several 
variants of the Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) CAPM and the Black (1972) CAPM 
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with an additional equally-weighted or correlation-weighted industry factor.  
Recognizing the criticisms of Roll (1977), Langetieg (1978) motivates his use of the 
industry factor because of the factor’s ex post explanatory power in the cross-section of 
returns.  Langetieg hypothesizes that inclusion of such a factor is also consistent with 
the multi-factor arbitrage pricing theory (APT) of Ross (1976).  He finds a significantly 
negative cumulative excess return on the order of -6.00% to -6.59% on a twelve month 
post-merger horizon for a sample of 149 firms from the CRSP delisting array over the 
period 1929 to 1969.  However, this return is not significantly different from that of a 
control sample of 141 firms within each sample firm’s two-digit standard industrial 
classification (SIC) code.  Controls are chosen that have the highest residual correlation 
(residual to the market) to the sample firm (within the same industry).  This result 
ultimately leads Langetieg (1978) to also support the efficient markets hypothesis. 
Asquith (1983) opts to employ a control portfolio approach to determining the 
expected return for merging firms.  Specifically, all NYSE and AMEX firms are formed 
into ten equally-weighted portfolios based on market beta.  The return on the portfolio 
with the beta closest to that of the sample firm is taken as the merged firm’s expected 
return.  Average daily excess returns are then calculated as the sample mean in event-
time.  For periods greater than one day, Asquith forms calendar-time portfolios of 
sample firms for which the completion date occurred within some previous period.  On 
each date in calendar-time, he calculates the mean return of the portfolio formed by the 
aforementioned rule.  A time-series average of mean portfolio excess returns yields the 
average standardized portfolio excess return to be tested.  For a period of 240 days after 
merger completion, his sample exhibits a significant -7.2% calendar-time abnormal 
return.   
Malatesta (1983) uses the now common market model to estimate parameters by 
ordinary least squares (OLS).  The forecast error is then calculated as the difference 
between the realized return of the merging firm and the return predicted by the 
estimated parameters of the model.  The sample of 121 mergers from 1969 to 1974 
demonstrates a significant -2.9% abnormal return over the twelve month post-merger 
horizon (the merger date is defined to be the date of board approval).  However,  
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Table 1 
Review of the Evidence Regarding Long-Term Post-Merger Returns. 
 
Articles examining the performance of completed mergers on a long-term horizon of 12 to 60 months are 
summarized in chronological order.  Month zero refers to the month of merger completion unless 
otherwise noted.  CAR refers to Cumulative Abnormal Return, BHAR refers to buy-and-hold abnormal 
return, and CTAR refers to a monthly calendar-time abnormal return. EW and VW refer to calculations 
based upon an equally-weighted and value-weighted benchmark, respectively. 
 
Study 
Reported 
Abnormal Return 
Event  
Window 
(months) 
Sample 
Size 
(firms) 
Sample 
Period Sample Details/Notes 
      
Mandelker (1974) 0.6% CAR 
0.1% CAR 
-1.4% CAR 
0.03 to 0.32% CTAR 
[0, +12] 
[0, +24] 
[0, +40] 
241 
 
1941-1962 NYSE acquirers 
      
Langetieg (1978) -6.59 to -6.00% CAR* 
-12.23 to -10.8% CAR* 
-26.15 to 22.3% CAR* 
[0, +12] 
[0, +24] 
[0, +72] 
149 
 
1929-1969 Mergers between NYSE firms with 
CRSP data for at least three years 
prior to and after the merger  
      
Asquith (1983) -7.2% CTAR* [0, +240] 
(days) 
196 1962-1976 All acquirers of NYSE targets  
      
Malatesta (1983) -2.9% CAR 
-13.7% CAR* 
[0, +12] 
[0, +12] 
 
121 
75 
1969-1974 
1971-1974 
Month 0 is month of board 
approval. Sample is targets with at 
least $10 million in assets. 
      
Franks, Harris and 
Titman (1991) 
-3.96 to +10.44%* CAR 
-0.22 to +0.37%* CTAR 
[0, +36] 
 
346 
 
1975-1984 Month 0 is month of final bid. 
NYSE & AMEX acqs. and targets 
      
Agrawal, Jaffe and 
Mandelker (1992) 
-1.53% CAR 
-4.94% CAR* 
-7.38% CAR* 
-8.67% CAR* 
-10.26% CAR* 
[0, +12] 
[0, +24] 
[0, +36] 
[0, +48] 
[0, +60] 
765 1955-1987 NYSE acquirers of NYSE and 
AMEX targets. 
      
Gregory (1997) -5.80 to -9.28% CAR* 
-11.18 to -17.06% CAR* 
-0.66 to -0.99% CTAR* 
[0, +12] 
[0, +24] 
452 1984-1992 “[All] successful UK domestic 
takeovers of listed companies by 
UK plcs with a bid value greater 
than £10 million”  
      
Loughran and Vijh 
(1997) 
-15.9% BHAR* 
-14.2% BHAR 
[0, +60] 
[0, +60] 
788 
434 
1970-1989 NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ 
targets.  Results are reported for the 
full sample and a subsample of non-
overlapping observations in the 60-
month window. 
      
Rau and Vermaelen 
(1998) 
-4.04% CAR* 
-2.58% CAR* 
[0, +36] 
[0, +36] 
2,823 
643 
1980-1991 NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ 
bidders from Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC).  Results are 
reported for the full sample and a 
subsample of public targets. 
      
Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000) 
-1.00% EW BHAR 
-3.80% VW BHAR 
-0.14% EW CTAR 
-0.07% VW CTAR 
[0, +36] 
[0, +36] 
 
2,068 
 
1958-1993 Data taken from CRSP-EVENTS 
database (under development) 
 
 
      
Megginson, Morgan 
and Nail (2003) 
-2.58% BHAR 
-9.86% BHAR* 
-6.62% BHAR 
[0, +12] 
[+13, +24] 
[+25, +36] 
204 1977-1996 Mergers from SDC as well as CRSP 
delistings that do not suffer from 
“confounding events” 
      
* Statistically significant at the 5.0% level or better. 
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Malatesta notes a difference between large and small acquirers over the twelve months 
following board approval.  Acquiring firms with a market value in excess of $300 
million twelve months prior to board approval display an insignificant 4.5% average 
forecast error while acquirers valued at less than $300 million display a significant -
7.7% average forecast error.  For the subperiod of 1971 to 1974, a significant forecast 
error of -13.7% is observed.  Malatesta (1983) appropriately notes that he has measured 
abnormal returns differently than Langetieg (1978) in that Langetieg actually 
constrained the cross-section of returns by implicitly assuming a known return 
generating process.  Malatesta offers that the difference between his results and those of 
Langetieg (1978) is this difference in methodologies.  Rather than interpret his results as 
inconsistent with market efficiency, Malatesta (1983) does not rule out the possibility 
that any technique used to determine expected returns perhaps does not adequately 
capture all relevant risk or changes in risk. 
Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) also support the notion that researchers use 
inadequate benchmarks for expected returns when examining post-merger returns.  
They pose that previous findings of negative abnormal returns are due to an incorrect 
adjustment for risk.  To correct for the fact that prior studies use inefficient benchmarks, 
Franks, Harris and Titman use a myriad of control portfolios constructed in a manner 
so as to be efficient.  They then analyze their sample of 399 firms from 1975 to 1984 in 
both event- and calendar-time over a thirty-six month interval.  Depending on the 
benchmark for expected returns used, they report a range of cumulative abnormal 
residuals in event-time of anywhere between an insignificant -3.96% to a significant 
+10.44%.  Their calendar-time abnormal return estimates also vary wildly from an 
insignificant -7.92% to a significant +13.22%.  They also analyze several subsamples of 
firms in an effort to confirm or refute the contention that there exist differences in post-
merger performance between different groups of acquirers.  Specifically, they partition 
the sample on the basis of means of payment, relative sizes of the target and bidder and 
the level of opposition by target managers.  Smaller bidders outperform larger bidders 
only when inefficient portfolios are used as benchmarks.  Use of efficient control 
portfolios mitigates or eliminates the difference in abnormal returns between the two 
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groups.  This finding holds when the sample is partitioned on the basis of relative size 
rather than raw size.  Likewise, the superior performance of cash bidders relative to 
stock bidders disappears when efficient benchmarks are used, and the superior 
performance of bids opposed by target managers also disappears.  Franks, Harris and 
Titman (1991) fail to find convincing evidence of either negative post-merger returns or 
differences in post-merger returns between subsamples formed on the basis of firm or 
deal characteristics.   
Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) find a significant negative CAR of -10.26% 
in the sixty months following mergers from 1955 to 1987.  They employ the model of 
Dimson and Marsh (1986) to adjust for size and changes in risk and argue that the 
Franks, Harris and Titman results are specific to their period of study.  Interestingly, 
their results are robust to the use of the calendar-time portfolio approach of Jaffe (1974) 
and Mandelker (1974).  They find no evidence of underperformance following tender 
offers. 
Gregory (1997) appropriately notes that the largest discrepancy between many 
studies of long-run bidder returns involves the choice of a model of expected returns.  
Gregory uses the CAPM, the Dimson and Marsh (1986) risk and size adjusted model, 
the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and several variants of the three as 
benchmarks.  Like Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992), he provides evidence of a 
change in model parameters from the pre-event to the post-event period and elects to 
estimate parameters during the post-event period.  For a sample of UK takeovers from 
1984 to 1992, Gregory (1997) finds a statistically significant -11.18% to -17.06% CAR in 
the post-merger period as far as twenty-four months into the future, regardless of the 
model of expected returns used.  Additionally, calendar-time regression results indicate 
a -0.66% to -0.99% monthly CTAR which is even more negative than the reported event-
time abnormal returns.  Gregory (1997) then partitions his sample on the basis of 
method of payment, whether or not the merger is of a conglomerate nature, whether 
the bid is hostile, whether the acquirer is a ‘regular’ acquirer in that the firm has 
acquired before and whether or not there was a competing bid for the target.  Cash 
bidders significantly outperform stock bidders and stock bidders significantly 
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underperform bids involving both cash and stock.  Abnormal returns for focusing 
acquisitions are significantly higher than those for conglomerate mergers (defined as 
bidder and target having a different two-digit Standard Industrial Classification [SIC] 
codes).  Likewise, hostile bids outperform friendly ones, and regular acquirers appear 
to do better than one-off acquirers.  There is no evidence to suggest that the arrival of a 
competing bid results in decreased performance for the acquirer. 
Similarly, Loughran and Vijh (1997) examine a sixty month post-merger horizon 
and find a -25.0% abnormal return for acquirers using stock versus a positive 61.7% 
abnormal return for cash acquirers.  Loughran and Vijh (1997) disagree with the 
monthly rebalancing conducted by Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) and Agrawal, Jaffe 
and Mandelker (1992) because it does not represent the experience of long-term 
shareholders of the acquiring and target firms.  Rather than using a benchmark asset 
pricing model, Loughran and Vijh (1997) select control firms on the basis of size and 
book-to-market equity and compare the returns of sample firms with those of the 
chosen control firms.  Overall, the difference between the buy-and-hold return of 
acquiring firms and the buy-and-hold return of control firms is a significant -15.9%.  For 
a subsample of non-overlapping observations during the 1970 to 1989 period, the 
BHAR of acquiring firms is an insignificant -14.2%. 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) utilize a control portfolio approach in calculating 
long-term underperformance of acquiring firms.  They report a significant -2.58% 
abnormal return for mergers involving public targets over a thirty-six month window 
after completion of the deal.  Their main contribution is to note that glamour acquirers 
(those with low book-to-market equity ratios) of public firms underperform on that 
same horizon by -10.82% while value acquirers (those with high book-to-market equity) 
overperform by +9.87%.  They argue that this effect potentially supercedes the effects of 
method of payment observed in many studies whereby cash acquirers typically 
outperform acquirers using stock as consideration because glamour acquirers use cash 
more frequently than value acquirers.  They argue that managers of glamour firms are 
more likely to suffer from hubris and overestimate their own ability to manage the 
assets of the target firm.  They interpret their results as consistent with the performance 
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extrapolation hypothesis first introduced by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) 
whereby investors extrapolate performance too far into the future resulting in an 
eventual reversal to fundamental value.   
From the standpoint of appropriately measuring abnormal returns, Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000) provide the most current and state-of-the-art technique.  Not only do 
they present evidence in favor of the use of the calendar-time methodology of Jaffe 
(1974) and Mandelker (1974), they apply many different techniques to a sample of 
mergers from 1958 to 1993.  Specifically, they apply the buy-and-hold strategy with 
bootstrapping adjustments suggested by Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) 
as well as the application of the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model with 
adjustments to the intercepts to reflect the fact that the asset pricing model cannot fully 
explain the returns of all twenty-five size and book-to-market portfolios that the model 
was intended to predict.  The adjusted alphas mitigate the abnormal performance 
attributed to model misspecification and provide a clearer picture of the abnormal 
performance due strictly to the event in question.  The greatest concern of Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000) is the non-independence of observations in samples of corporate events 
such as mergers, seasoned equity offerings and share repurchases.  While the bootstrap 
procedure reduces the bias associated with assuming a normally distributed abnormal 
return test statistic, the issue of non-independence actually increases in sample size as 
the covariance term of the standard deviation of the statistic eventually dominates the 
own-variance component.  They conclude that tests for abnormal returns should be 
conducted using the calendar-time method.  They do admit, however, that the calendar-
time method is not without its own concerns (including heteroskedasticity, the 
assumption that factor loadings remain constant through time, equal weighting of each 
month and low power); however, unlike the issue of non-independence, these issues 
can be solved econometrically with relatively standard robustness checks.  Calculation 
of adjusted CTARs reveals that many of the market efficiency contradictions proposed 
in the literature of post-merger returns are spurious.  With calendar-time portfolios, the 
only subsample of acquirers to statistically underperform are those offering stock 
consideration, but even this underperformance becomes only marginally significant 
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when calendar-time portfolios are value-weighted.  They find no evidence to suggest 
that value acquirers outperform glamour acquirers. 
Megginson, Morgan and Nail (2003) argue that corporate focus is the main 
determinant of post-merger performance.  Their results show that mergers of a 
diversifying nature underperform those of a focusing nature by significant 10.99% in 
the first twelve months after merger completion and by an additional 17.67% and 
21.58% (both significant) in the subsequent two twelve-month periods respectively.  
Similarly, they find that cash acquirers significantly outperform stock acquirers and, 
contrary to Rau and Vermaelen (1998), that there is not significant difference between 
glamour and value acquirers.  Whereas Gregory (1997) and Agrawal, Jaffe and 
Mandelker (1992) defined a merger as conglomerate in nature if the bidder and target 
differ in their two-digit SIC code, Megginson, Morgan and Nail (2003) develop a 
continuous Herfindahl index based on the multiple lines of business of both the bidder 
and target.  They argue that this is a better metric from which to gauge corporate focus, 
and they even incorporate the notion of business segments into their matching 
procedure in order to form control portfolios.  Perhaps the most striking aspect of their 
study is the construction of their sample.  From the universe of firms making 
acquisitions from 1977 to 1996, they remove all acquirers who undertake confounding 
events during the period of analysis (including capital structure changes, etc.).  As a 
result, their sample size is small compared with the number of total mergers that 
occurred during that period. 
 
2.4 The Interaction of Mergers and Internal Governance Mechanisms 
 Corporate governance mechanisms are intended to more closely align the 
potentially divergent interests of managers and shareholders.  This divergence exists 
because of the separation of ownership and control (the principal-agent relationship) in 
public U.S. corporations.  Generally, governance mechanisms are classified as either 
external or internal.  External mechanisms include both the market for managerial labor 
and the market for corporate control.  Managers posses reputational capital which may 
or may not allow them to find employment if they do not perform well in their role as 
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agent; therefore, the manager has an incentive to align his or her interests with those of 
the firm’s shareholders.  The market for corporate control disciplines poorly performing 
managers by removing them from their positions via mergers, tender offers or proxy 
fights.  Of course the market for managerial labor and the market for corporate control 
are not always mutually exclusive or distinct mechanisms.  In many instances, they are 
employed simultaneously. 
 In general, there are five governance mechanisms which are internal to the firm.  
First, proper executive compensation may reduce the agency costs associated with 
differences between shareholders and managers arising from differences in managerial 
preferences for risk and in investment horizons.  A manager who is compensated via 
performance-based pay on a correct time horizon should have a preference for risk and 
an investment horizon that is in keeping with shareholder value maximization.  Second, 
the mechanism of insider ownership accomplishes similar goals to those of 
compensation.  In the absence of managerial entrenchment, a higher level of ownership 
by inside executives should result in a decrease in the agency costs associated with 
differential risk preferences and investment horizons.  Third, the members of the board 
of directors act as shareholder representatives in the duty of overseeing and 
disciplining management.  While not directly involved in the day-to-day operations of 
the firm, the board’s ultimate power lies in its ability to hire and fire top members of the 
company management team.  They are also the approval authority for any dividends 
that the firm pays.  Fourth, large outside blockholders provide an additional 
monitoring role.  While it is too costly for a smaller shareholder to actively monitor the 
actions of managers, larger shareholders typically have both the means and the 
incentive to do so.  Finally, debt and dividends decrease the amount of free cash flow 
available to managers after the acceptance of positive NPV projects.  Both require 
managers to disgorge cash to appropriate claimants of the firm’s cash inflows rather 
than allowing them to squander it on pet (negative NPV) investment opportunities.  Of 
course, each of these mechanisms (and the two external mechanisms discussed above) 
is not without their own costs as well. 
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 There is evidence to support the notion that corporate governance is related to 
long-term stock returns.  Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) examine shareholder 
protection from the perspective of management-friendly corporate charter 
characteristics and form a governance index from twenty-four potential firm 
antitakeover provisions and state laws during the 1990s.  Specifically, for the existence 
(absence) of each of the twenty-four management-friendly (shareholder-friendly) 
provisions, a firm receives one point.  The index for each firm is then simply the sum of 
the points derived from each provision.  While this method does not weight each 
provision by its relative importance, its equal weighting allows for a tractable measure 
of strong versus weak shareholder protection.   Firms are then categorized into deciles 
based on their index values.  A portfolio that is long in democracies and short in 
dictatorships earns an annual abnormal return of 8.5% when the Carhart (1997) four-
factor model is used as a benchmark for expected returns.  The long and short positions 
appear to contribute almost equally to this abnormal return.  While they interpret the 
possible causality of this result with caution, their evidence is generally consistent with 
the notion that these antitakeover provisions create higher agency costs.  In support of 
this hypothesis, they show that firms with weaker shareholder protection have a greater 
amount of capital expenditures and a greater incidence of being an acquirer of another 
firm.  They state that an interpretation of their results is that “[weak shareholder 
protection] firms engaged in an unexpectedly large amount of inefficient investment 
during the 1990s” (p. 136). 
 While the research on corporate governance and long-run stock returns is 
relatively new, there has been substantial work on corporate governance in general and 
its impact on initial market reactions to mergers and acquisitions indicating that 
governance could potentially matter on a longer horizon.  In establishing the existence 
of agency problems at acquiring firms, Morck, Shliefer and Vishny (1990) argue that 
bidding managers overpay for targets that offer them a higher level of personal 
benefits.  In motivating their study, they make the following statement: 
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While it is incorrect to say that managers make investment decisions 
without regard for market value consequences, it is also incorrect to say 
that existing monitoring and control devices keep managers from 
pursuing non-value-maximizing objectives. (p. 32) 
 
 
Their results show that contrary to the predictions of Roll’s (1986) hubris hypothesis of 
takeovers, managers of firms that have recently performed well make better 
acquisitions.  Managers who are buying targets that have recently done well do not 
make better acquisitions, and conglomerate mergers were not well received in the 
1980s.  They interpret this evidence as consistent with the existence of agency problems 
in many acquiring firms.  If, in fact, these problems exist and governance mechanisms 
are effective, we should observe firms with good governance making better 
acquisitions. 
 Corporate governance could matter because of recent changes in the structure of 
the mechanisms themselves.  While the effectiveness of these changes is still under 
scrutiny, all of the aforementioned internal governance mechanisms have undergone 
large changes over time.  As an example, there has been a substantial increase in the 
level of ownership of inside management over the last couple of decades.  Holderness, 
Kroszner and Sheehan (1999) show that managerial ownership has increased 
significantly since 1935 and that ownership has not risen as a result of ownership being 
a substitute for other mechanisms such as incentive-based pay and the market for 
corporate control.  According to the classical agency model of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), an increased level of ownership by inside managers should result in lower 
agency costs.  In fact, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes 
(1990) find that firm value (measured by Tobin’s Q) increases with the level of insider 
ownership, but only up to a point.  For higher levels of inside ownership, firm value 
appears to decrease.  Therefore, there is empirical evidence that a firm might have a 
level of inside ownership that is “too high”.  In the context of the market for corporate 
control, Lewellen, Loderer and Rosenfeld (1985) show that announcement period 
abnormal stock returns are positively related to the percentage of stock ownership of 
bidder management.  Their measures of ownership include Jensen and Meckling’s 
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(1976) alpha – the percentage ownership of senior management - and two cost/benefit 
indices intended to more accurately capture the benefits of making a poor bid as well as 
the costs associated with it.  They use the ratio of the dollar value of management’s 
shareholdings divided by their current compensation and the ratio of the expected 
annual income from shareholdings to current compensation.  Their results hold for each 
of the three measures of ownership.  Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) also show that the 
ownership of insiders is higher for firms that chose mergers (and divestitures) that 
increase the variance of the firm’s stock returns and hence the value of the firm’s shares. 
With regard to management compensation, Hall and Liebman (1998) challenge 
the Jensen and Murphy (1990) finding that CEO pay is relatively insensitive to changes 
in shareholder wealth.  Specifically, Hall and Liebman (1998) examine the pay-
performance sensitivities of CEOs over the past two decades and find that salary and 
bonuses have doubled since the early 1980s.  Stock option grants have also increased in 
value by a median amount of 683.0%.  It wasn’t until 1985 that the median CEO even 
received a single stock option grant.  They estimate that a 10% increase in firm value 
results in an increase in the median CEOs salary and bonus of $25,000.  This same 10% 
increase in firm value results in a $1.25 million increase in the value of the CEOs equity 
holdings and stock option grants.  This is a marked difference from the Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) finding that a $1,000 change in shareholder wealth results in a $3.25 
change in total CEO compensation.  Such an increase in the performance-related pay of 
executives over the past few decades should manifest itself in fewer agency problems 
between inside management and outside shareholders.  Managers in more recent times 
should be better motivated to make investment decisions (such as acquisitions) that 
increase value.  Of course the pay structure itself could become a negative NPV project 
as well. 
Hall and Liebman (2000) then examine tax law changes concerning CEO pay 
and find that regulatory changes (such as changes in tax rates and the “million dollar 
rule”) have had only a modest impact on the decision to pay CEOs on a more 
performance-related basis.   
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With regard to the market for corporate control, for a sample of bank mergers 
from 1986 to 1995, Bliss and Rosen (2001) find that CEOs with more stock-based 
compensation were less likely to make an acquisition at all.  They also report that for 
their sample of completed mergers, compensation increased for managers with their 
pay tied to the size of the firm despite the significant negative market response to the 
deal during the short-term announcement period. 
The monitoring role of outside blockholders has changed recently as well.  
Specifically, Gompers and Metrick (2001) find that large institutional investors doubled 
their share of the stock market from 1980 to 1996, mainly due to an increase in holdings 
by mutual funds and investment advisors.  By 1996, these large institutions owned 
more than half of the total equity market in the U.S.  If it is less costly for large outside 
shareholders to monitor managers than for smaller atomistic shareholders, one should 
observe managers of firms with a greater percentage of large outside shareholders 
making better investment decisions than managers of firms with a smaller percentage 
of outside shareholders because of the more active monitoring role served by the block 
shareholders.  In fact, Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) find that large blockholders 
more actively vote on antitakeover proposals than do smaller individual investors, and 
the direction of their voting is in keeping with maximization of shareholder value 
rather than being cozy with management.  McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a 
significantly positive relation between firm value and the percentage ownership held 
by outside blockholders.  Woidtke (2002) delineates between public and private pension 
funds and finds a positive relation between private pension fund ownership and overall 
firm value after controlling for endogeneity. 
 The structure of boards of directors has changed over the past few decades as 
well.  The most thorough analysis of these changes is provided by Huson, Parrino and 
Starks (2001).  They report that from 1971 to 1994, boards of directors changed to 
include a greater percentage of outsiders and average board size decreased.2   
                                                 
2 Huson, Parrino and Starks (2001) also report that executive compensation changed to include more 
performance-based incentives and that outside blockholders exerted more external pressure. 
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While Huson, et. al. (2001) do not attribute their observed increase in CEO 
removal to the effectiveness of various corporate governance mechanisms, Byrd and 
Hickman (1992) find that announcement returns for tender offer transactions are greater 
for firms with boards dominated by non-affiliated outsiders than for firms whose 
boards are comprised mostly of insiders or affiliated outsiders.   This finding is not 
linear, however, as announcement returns for firms with too many independent outside 
directors is actually negative.  While their finding of a relation between tender offer 
announcement returns and board independence is interesting, perhaps their greatest 
finding is that their results are sensitive to properly classifying directors as insiders, 
affiliated outsiders (grey members), or independent outsiders.  This more precise 
measurement of board independence allows them to eliminate much of the noise 
associated with the unknown monitoring role of affiliated outside directors.3   
In a survey and examination of corporate governance and mergers during the 
1980s and 1990s, Holstrom and Kaplan (2001) state that “the evidence strongly suggests 
that U.S. corporations have voluntarily pursued shareholder-friendly policies in the 
1990s” (p. 136).  This overall improvement in corporate governance was a main reason 
for the more friendly nature of the merger transactions of the 1990s compared with the 
more hostile deals observed in the 1980s.  For example, the increase of performance-
related compensation contributed to manager support of value increasing acquisitions.  
Holstrom and Kaplan (2001) also argue that the 1980s were marked with the “pain” 
associated with dismantling the most inefficient of the conglomerates formed in earlier 
decades.  The restructuring efforts of the 1990s were instead geared toward benefiting 
from growth opportunities in new industries.   
To this point, the discussion has developed around the evidence which suggests 
that governance affects firms’ investment decisions (namely corporate control 
transactions).  However, there is also evidence that governance mechanisms may be 
ineffective or less effective than they should be.  Holstrom and Kaplan (2003) cite 
                                                 
3 Cotter, Shivdasani and Zenner (1997) examine the independence of target boards in tender offers and find 
that independent boards are associated with larger offer premiums, and larger target shareholder gains 
over the entire tender offer period. 
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anecdotal evidence of recent governance failures at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and others.  
Regardless of whether or not this evidence is supported from a statistical and economic 
perspective, they point to recent legal and regulatory changes that have been enacted in 
an effort to “fix” the apparent shortcomings of corporate governance in U.S. firms.  
Specifically, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 created new rules pertaining to boards of 
directors, shareholder monitoring and executive compensation.  For example, audit 
committees must now be comprised solely of outside directors, financial and insider 
trading disclosures have become more stringent and the possibility of managers 
profiting from misconduct has been reduced by forcing them to abandon ownership 
positions that are beneficial once misconduct has been substantiated.   
The federal government is not the only institution mandating changes in 
corporate governance.  The NYSE and NASDAQ have both submitted proposals in the 
hopes of strengthening the governance of their listed firms.  These proposals suggest a 
much greater role for independent directors including their service on compensation 
and nominating committees.  The proposals also call for equity compensation plans to 
be approved by all shareholders, and they suggest that a majority of directorships be 
held by non-affiliated outsiders who meet regularly without the presence of inside 
directors. 
Perhaps the most critical view of corporate governance mechanisms is given by 
Jensen (1986, 1988, 1993).  He argues that the takeovers of the 1980s were a result of a 
failure of corporate governance mechanisms to properly motivate managers.  Instead, 
managers were allowed to finance losing operations with the free cash flow generated 
from more profitable operations within the firm (Jensen (1986)).  Boards of directors 
failed to see the need for exit due to the excess capacity created by recent increases in 
productivity.  Jensen (1993) argues that boards are too cordial in their approach to 
disciplining management, they are too large to be effective and they are often more 
concerned with minimizing liability than they are with the pursuit of value creation.  In 
the very worst cases, CEOs also serve as board chairman (whose main function is to 
monitor the CEO).  Such boards, combined with lack-luster outside block shareholder 
oversight, allowed cross-subsidization of diversified firm operations to continue.  The 
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market for corporate control in the 1980s was a way in which to eliminate the 
inappropriate use of firm free cash flow.  Jensen (1993) goes so far as to predict the 
emergence of the leveraged buy-out (LBO) firm as the preeminent business form of the 
future due to the increased effectiveness of its internal governance mechanisms to 
eliminate cross-subsidization.  Harford (1999) supports the Jensen (1986) free cash flow 
hypothesis of takeovers.  He finds that the portion of cash-rich firms making 
diversifying acquisitions is significantly higher than for firms will less cash.  Targets of 
firms with larger amounts of cash on hand are also less likely to attract multiple 
bidders.  After completion of the merger, operating performance of the newly formed 
firm deteriorates.  Harford concludes that cash-rich firms undertake value-destroying 
investment decisions.4 
Finally, as mentioned previously, Huson, Parrino and Starks (2001) find that 
many of Jensen’s (1993) suggestions have come to fruition in the changing dynamics of 
governance characteristics.  Board sizes have decreased, and there is greater percentage 
of outside directors on the average board.  External pressure has increased from outside 
institutional shareholders.  However, those changes have not had a significant impact 
on the likelihood of CEO removal and outside replacement.  At least with regard to this 
particular decision, they suggest that improvements in corporate governance haven’t 
improved the quality of the monitoring that was intended by the changes.   
                                                 
4 Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) provide an in-depth study of the tradeoff between the costs 
associated with free cash flow and the benefits of maintaining financial slack. 
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CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT, DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Hypotheses Development 
 The central proposition of this paper is that firms with good internal governance 
structures make better acquisitions due to the decreased agency costs associated with 
the separation of ownership and control.  As such, three internal governance 
characteristics are analyzed: managerial compensation, managerial ownership, and 
large outside shareholder ownership.   
Management Compensation: Performance-based pay for inside executives 
serves to reduce their divergent preferences for a shorter investment horizon and their 
own personal preferences for avoiding risk.  For example, managers with an 
inappropriately structured compensation structure have an incentive to maximize 
shareholder value during their tenure of employment at the expense of shareholder 
value after their departure.  In the absence of equity incentives, managers have an 
incentive to make less risky investments because their own undiversifiable human 
capital is tied to the firm.  Option or stock-based compensation mitigates these 
problems, and one should observe better acquisitions (and other capital budgeting 
decisions) by firms who compensate their executives more heavily on a performance-
related basis. 
 
H1: On a twelve- to sixty-month post-merger horizon, acquirers with CEOs 
compensated more heavily on an incentive basis (options and grants) 
outperform acquirers who compensate CEOs via a greater percentage of 
base salary and bonus in the total compensation package. 
 
 
To test H1, I calculate a variable Comp for each acquiring firm which is defined 
as the percentage of total CEO compensation value that comes in the form of equity-
based pay.   
 
(3.1) onCompensatiEquityandCashAllofValue
YearPriorinReceivedOptionsStockandGrantsStockRestrictedofValueComp =
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Data for this variable are collected from Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database.   
If performance-based pay serves to align the interests of shareholders and 
managers, we should observe a positive relation between the long-run abnormal 
returns and Comp.  If incentive pay in the form of equity does not reduce the agency 
problems of differential horizons and risk preferences, we would expect the coefficient 
on Comp in a multivariate regression to be insignificant. 
 
Management Ownership: Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that “the most 
important [agency] conflict arises from the fact that as the manager’s ownership claim 
falls, his incentive to devote significant effort to creative activities such as searching out 
new profitable ventures falls” (p. 90).  They therefore predict a positive monotonic 
relation between management ownership and firm value. 
Stulz (1988) presents a model whereby the fraction of managerial control of 
voting rights increases firm value for low levels of management control because the 
management objections to potential acquirers will increase the premium offered for the 
firm’s shares.  At higher levels of control over voting rights, the value of the firm should 
decrease with increased levels of control over voting rights because the probability of a 
successful takeover is reduced and eventually eliminated due to managerial 
entrenchment.  In other words, there is some interior optimal percentage of managerial 
control that maximizes the value of the firm.  Morck, Schleifer and Vishny (1988) and 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) assume that management ownership serves as an 
adequate proxy for the percentage of voting rights under management’s control and 
test the Stulz (1988) model.  Both papers utilize Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value and 
find a positive relation between insider ownership and firm value for low levels of firm 
ownership but a negative relation for higher levels of ownership. 
 
H2: On a twelve- to sixty-month post-merger horizon, acquirers whose 
officers and directors own a larger percentage of company shares 
outperform acquirers whose CEOs own a lesser percentage of their 
firm’s shares. 
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To test H2, I calculate the variable InsideOwn, defined as the percentage of total 
company shares held by the top executives and directors reported by the firm in 
company proxy statements.  These data are collected from Disclosure CD-ROM 
(commonly referred to as Compact Disclosure).   
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) predict a positive relation between long-run 
acquirer returns and InsideOwn, while Stulz (1988) predicts a positive relation only for 
lower levels of inside ownership.  Entrenched managers (of acquirers as well as targets) 
should not be as affected by the mechanism of inside ownership if they are able to 
garner personal non-pecuniary benefits from a merger whose value exceeds the 
personal wealth effects of a value-destroying deal.  Therefore, Stulz (1988) predicts a 
negative relation for larger values of InsideOwn. 
 
Outside Block Shareholders: Shleifer and Vishny (1986) present a model of large 
outside shareholders and monitoring functions they perform.  In their model, large 
shareholders are able to bring about changes in the firm that provide an increase in 
value that is large enough to outweigh the costs of the monitoring and oversight.  Their 
model predicts that an increase in the level of ownership by a large shareholder 
increases the likelihood of being acquired, but they do not speak to the effects of being 
an acquirer.  They also ignore potential interactions between multiple blockholders 
which might be important for a sample of acquiring firms since acquirers tend to be 
larger firms with a greater number of institutional shareholders.  However, if large 
shareholders benefit from monitoring management, one would expect acquisitions by 
firms with a higher level of large outside blockholder ownership to be better 
investments. 
 
H3: On a twelve- to sixty-month post-merger horizon, acquirers with a greater 
percentage of company shares held by large outside blockholders 
outperform acquirers with a lesser percentage of outside ownership. 
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To test H3, I gather data from Compact Disclosure on the level of ownership 
held by outside blockholders that are reported on quarterly form 13F of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) indicating that they have acquired positions valued at 
greater than $200,000 or positions of greater than 10,000 shares of the sample firm’s 
outstanding shares.  I then form the variable InstOwn as the percentage of the total 
number of outstanding shares held by outside block shareholders.   
Empirically, Pound (1988) shows that proxy fights are a less preferred method 
for gaining corporate control because of the three factors: 1) the inherent difficulty in 
mounting a successful fight against incumbent managers, 2) the conflict of interest that  
potentially exists between many large shareholders that have other business dealings 
with the firm and 3) the possibility that the initiator of a proxy fight is not as serious 
about the issue in question because a lesser amount of resources is needed to 
accomplish control than is necessary for a successful merger or tender offer.  Focusing 
on his second factor, it is entirely possible that outside block shareholders may be too 
cozy with current management to properly monitor their actions with regard to an 
acquisition decision.  Additionally, large outside shareholders usually suffer from their 
own agency problems that could potentially weaken the monitoring role which they are 
credited with serving.  In either of these instances, we should observe an insignificant 
or negative coefficient on InstOwn in multivariate regressions.   
Contradictory to Pound’s (1988) evidence that some blockholders are too cozy 
with management, McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Woidtke (2002) find statistically 
reliable evidence of a positive relation between the level of institutional ownership and 
overall firm value.  If, in fact, large outside shareholders properly monitor managers, 
we should observe a positive sign on the coefficient of InstOwn. 
 
3.2 Data 
 The sample for this study comes from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) 
Mergers and Acquisitions Database.  It includes all completed mergers and acquisitions of 
one hundred percent of assets from 1993 to 2000.  In order to be included in the sample, 
both the target and the bidder must be listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ 
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exchange.  Both the bidder and target must have return data on the Center for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly tapes with a CRSP share code of 10 or 11 (this 
excludes deals involving American Depository Receipts (ADRs), Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REITs) and closed-end mutual funds).  Additionally, book equity values are 
required from the annual Compustat files.  Deals involving regulated utilities or 
financial institutions are removed to avoid contamination of the results from the 
regulatory shocks involved in those two particular industries.5  The final sample is 484 
mergers and tender offers completed between 1993 and 2000.  For a detailed description 
of the sample construction, see table 2. 
 SDC lists a total of 2,262 completed mergers or tender offers that were 
completed between January 1, 1993 and December 31, 2000.  Of these deals, 326 do not 
have either the acquirer or target permno available in the CRSP monthly stock return 
files.  Of the remaining deals, 722 involve either a financial firm or a regulated utility 
(SIC codes 49 or 60 to 69), 62 deals involve an acquiring firm with a missing or negative 
book value of common equity in Compustat.  Finally, 668 acquirers are not tracked by 
Standard and Poor’s in the ExecuComp database.  The final sample consists of 484 deals 
(344 mergers and 140 tender offers).  SDC provides data on the announcement date, the 
completion date, acquirer and target six-digit cusip, total deal value, form of payment 
and whether or not the deal was classified as a merger or tender offer. 
Returns on 30-day treasury bills are taken from the CRSP monthly treasury 
index files.  Data on the market risk premium and additional factors of the various asset 
pricing models are gathered from the website of Ken French at Dartmouth: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/.  Specifically, he provides 
returns on the zero investment portfolios based on size (SMB), book-to-market equity 
(HML) and momentum (UMD). 
For the years 1992 to 2001, compensation data are taken from the Standard and 
Poor’s ExecuComp database.  Management and director shareholdings, as well as 
ownership of large outside shareholders are taken from Compact Disclosure.  In each 
                                                 
5 For a detailed analysis of regulatory shocks and their impact on the market for corporate control, see 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) and Holstrom and Kaplan (2001). 
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instance, governance data are collected as of the most recent reporting date prior to the 
completion of the merger.  I chose twelve months as a cutoff because firms are required 
to submit proxy information every twelve months to the SEC.   
 
Table 2 
Sample Selection. 
 
The sample of firms is taken from Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions Database of 
all merger and tender offer transactions from 1993 to 2000.  Forms of the deal include mergers, acquisition 
of assets and acquisition of majority interests.  Both acquirer and target are required to be listed on the 
NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ.  Proxy fights are excluded.  Firms are then required to have sufficient data on 
both CRSP and Compustat.  Proxy information regarding firm governance characteristics is also required to 
be found in Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp Database. 
 
Screen/Filter 
Number 
of Deals 
% of Lost 
Observations 
   
Completed Mergers, Acquisitions of Assets and Acquisitions of Minority 
Interests listed in the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Mergers and 
Acquisitions Database from January 1, 1993 through December 31, 2000. 2,262 
 
   
CRSP Permno unavailable for Acquirer or Target (326) 18.34% 
   
Number of Deals Involving a Financial Firm (2-digit SIC Codes 60 to 69 ) (639) 35.94% 
   
Number of Deals Involving a Regulated Utility (2-digit SIC code 49 ) (83) 4.67% 
   
Missing values for Compustat Item #60 (Common Equity – Total) (29) 1.63% 
   
Negative Value for Compustat Item #60 (Common Equity – Total) (33) 1.86% 
   
Data unavailable in ExecuComp Database (668) 37.57% 
   
Final Sample 484  
 
Limiting information to the previous twelve months also has the advantage of 
capturing any last minute changes in governance that the firm may undertake due to 
the corporate control transaction (such as re-pricing of executive stock options).  This 
procedure has the added advantage of ensuring no look-ahead bias in the analysis.   
Summary statistics for the sample are provided in table 3.  Panel A provides 
information about the individual acquirers as well as several deal characteristics that 
are included as cross-sectional variables in the analysis.  The reported variable Days 
b/w measures the number of trading days that occur between the announcement and 
completion of the merger.  There is an average (median) of about 79 (66) days between 
public revelation and deal completion, and approximately 98.0% of the mergers in the 
sample are completed within twelve months of the announcement of the deal.  The 
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average market capitalization of an acquirer in the sample is $25.39 billion with an 
average book value of assets of $3.6 billion.  The average target firm is 15.8% of the size 
of the acquirer when measured using market capitalization to capture size, and the 
typical acquirer has a book-to-market equity ratio of 0.30.  Identified by a difference in 
two-digit SIC codes of the acquirer and target, 43.4% of the sample is diversifying in 
nature while the remainder of the mergers occur between firms with the same two-digit 
SIC code.  Acquirers use equity as at least a portion of the consideration given in 62.0% 
of the cases, and 28.9% of the deals are structured as tender offers. 
Statistics on governance characteristics are also given in Panel A of table 3.  In 
the twelve months prior to the acquisition, the average acquiring CEO receives 47.5% of 
his or her total compensation in the form of equity incentives.  It is interesting to note, 
however, that many CEOs included in the acquirer sample receive no equity incentive 
compensation in their reported pay in the year prior to the deal.  The 10th percentile of 
the variable Comp is still 0.00%.  These compensation data compare with the sample of 
Hall and Liebman (1998) in which they report a mean equity incentive percentage of 
48.4% for the year 1994 (the last year of their study).  Their sample is also skewed by 
outliers as they report a median value of 23.64% for the same statistic (compared with 
31.6% for the acquirer sample).  The difference is explained by the fact that 1994 is the 
last year of the Hall and Liebman study while the period of analysis for this study 
begins in 1993 and ends in 2000.  Equity incentives as a percentage of total CEO 
compensation have increased sharply over the later period.   
The mean value of the variable InsideOwn is 8.10% which is higher than one 
would expect for a sample involving firms as large as the ones here; however, the 
median value of 2.60% reveals that a few outliers are distorting the mean.  Of the 484 
firms in the sample, only 390 have data for officer and director ownership available in 
Compact Disclosure.  Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan (1999) report a mean (median) 
value of 21.1% (14.4%) officer and director ownership in 1995 for the full sample of 
4,202 firms for which there is data available from Compact Disclosure.  The lower level 
of ownership prevalent in the sample is due to the fact that the typical sample firm is  
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Table 3 
Sample Descriptive Statistics. 
 
Descriptive statistics of acquiring firms is provided.  The sample is divided into mergers and tender offers.  
Sample firms are taken from Security Data Corporation’s Mergers and Acquisitions Database which also 
provides data on deal values and method of payment.  MktCap is the market value of the firm’s 
outstanding equity as of the last trading day of the month prior to the merger announcement.  Assets is the 
book value of the firm’s assets as of the most recent Compustat listing prior to the announcement but not 
more than twelve months prior.  RelSize is the size of the target relative to that of the acquirer.  B/M is the 
book to market ratio of the acquirer.  Diversify is an indicator variable equal to one if acquirer and target 
have different two-digit SIC codes.  Stock is an indicator equal to one if the acquirer used equity as all or as 
a portion of the consideration.  Tend is an indicator equal to one if the deal is structured as a tender offer.  
Governance variables include Comp defined as the percentage of CEO compensation consisting of equity 
incentives during the twelve months prior to the merger announcement.  InsideOwn is the percentage 
ownership of all officers and directors as reported by Compact Disclosure within twelve months prior to 
the announcement of the merger.  InstOwn is the percentage ownership of institutional investors as 
reported by 13-F filings to the SEC in the twelve months prior to the announcement.  Days b/w is the 
number of trading days between the announcement and the completion date of the merger.   
 
Panel A: Cross Sectional Variables      
         
 N Mean Std. Dev. Median 10th Pctl 90th Pctl Min Max 
         
MktCap ($MM) 484 25,385.99 59,881.03 4,396.25 496.22 76,200.66 91.06 524,351.58 
Assets ($MM) 484 3,577.18 7,135.57 999.56 146.11 9,898.00 22.67 78,927.00 
RelSize 484 0.16 0.25 0.07 0.00 0.41 0.00 2.48 
B/M 484 0.30 0.29 0.22 0.07 0.59 0.01 2.83 
Diversify 484 0.43 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Stock 484 0.62 0.49 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Tend 484 0.29 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Comp 484 0.48 0.32 0.54 0.00 0.85 0.00 1.00 
InsideOwn 390 0.08 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.74 
InstOwn 429 0.64 0.19 0.66 0.39 0.85 0.02 1.00 
Days b/w 484 78.80 0.55 66.00 0.29 141.00 1.00 473.00 
         
 
 
Panel B: Deal Characteristics         
     Deal Structure  Consideration 
Year 
Acquisition 
Announced 
 
 
N 
Average 
Deal Value 
(millions) 
Total 
Deal Value 
(millions) 
 
Merger 
Tender 
Offer 
  
 
Cash 
 
 
Stock 
 
 
Hybrid 
 
 
Other 
1992 2 n/a n/a  2 0  1 0 1 0 
1993 13 201.66 2,621.59  11 2  4 4 3 2 
1994 17 252.94 4,299.91  11 6  6 9 2 0 
1995 42 1,423.62 58,368.40  32 10  12 24 5 1 
1996 58 1,290.71 74,860.97  42 16  20 27 10 1 
1997 56 593.16 32,030.46  41 15  18 26 9 3 
1998 89 2,719.46 242,032.02  65 24  30 36 19 4 
1999 116 2,907.71 337,293.84  83 33  43 48 23 2 
2000 91 2,345.19 213,412.26  57 34  36 37 17 1 
            
Total 484 2,014.45 964,919.43  344 140  170 211 89 14 
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much larger than average.  One would expect a larger firm to have a lower level of 
officer and director ownership. 
Likewise, information is available on the outside blockholders for 429 of the 484 
sample firms.  The variable InstOwn has an average value of 63.9%.  The median 
institutional ownership level of 66.4% is higher than the mean, implying that there is a 
large presence of outside block shareholders in the sample firms.  Gompers and Metrick 
(2001) report that institutions owned only 51.6% of the total market value of all listed 
firms in 1996. 
 Panel B provides statistics on the sample by year.  Consistent with Andrade, 
Mitchell and Stafford (2001), the number of deals increases in the later 1990s and the 
average value of those deals increases as well.  In contrast to the hostile nature of 
takeovers in the 1980s, the sample demonstrates a relatively constant balance between 
deals structured as either mergers or tender offers throughout the period.  Lastly, in 
each year but 1992, stock was the most popular method of payment in the acquisition 
market.   
 
3.3 Methodology 
 Announcement Date Analysis:  In order to provide a more complete picture of 
how the market incorporates news of the merger into the stock price, I first conduct a 
standard announcement date event study as suggested by Brown and Warner (1995).  
Specifically, the abnormal return for each sample firm is calculated each day 
surrounding the announcement as the return of the sample firm less the return of the 
value-weighted CRSP market index including all distributions.  The abnormal return 
for each event day is then averaged across all firms in the sample to calculate an overall 
average abnormal return for that date:  
(3.2) 
 
where N is the number of firms in the sample, Rit is the return on firm i on day t, and 
RMt is the return on the market proxy. 
( )∑
=
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 To assess the impact of corporate governance on the incorporation of 
announcement information, I repeat the above procedure for subsamples of acquirers 
created by partitioning the sample according to the three governance variables (Comp, 
InsideOwn and InstOwn).  For example, an acquirer is categorized as having a high 
level of incentive compensation if the value of Comp for that firm is above the sample 
median in that year.  For completeness, median abnormal returns are also reported. 
 Looking ahead somewhat, I then conduct multivariate regressions of the mean 
abnormal announcement date return on the variables hypothesized to explain the cross-
sectional variation in long-run abnormal stock returns.  A detailed description of the 
variables used in this analysis of announcement date returns is provided below in the 
discussion of long-run return analysis. 
 
Calendar-time Analysis: The univariate tests of long-run market efficiency 
employed in this paper are derived from the calendar-time analysis of Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000) and are intended to expand their findings.  They argue that other 
methods of calculating abnormal returns fail to account for the non-independence of 
event firms.  Subsequently, standard errors in the denominators of the t-statistics of the 
abnormal return estimates are too small because the covariance term is ignored.  
Bootstrapping procedures recommended by other researchers to improve the 
distribution of the statistic (toward normality) actually increase the problem of non-
independence because the covariance term of the standard error estimate is increasing 
in sample size.  To solve the more problematic issue of non-independence, Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000) recommend the calendar-time analysis originally developed by Jaffe 
(1974) and Mandelker (1974) in which the cross-correlation of event firms is 
automatically accounted for in the portfolio variance. 
For each month in calendar-time, either an equally-weighted or value-weighted 
portfolio of all firms is formed including all firms that have completed a merger in the 
past 12, 36, or 60 months.  Since I am interested in the post-merger performance of 
newly merged firms, the period of analysis begins on the first trading day of the month 
subsequent to the actual completion date.  Equally- or value-weighted portfolio excess 
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returns are then calculated by subtracting the thirty-day Treasury bill rate from the 
equally- or value-weighted portfolio return.  The result of this process is a time-series of 
calendar-time portfolio excess returns over and above the risk-free rate of interest. 
A time-series regression of the portfolio excess returns on the Carhart (1997) 
four-factor model is then performed according to the following specification: 
 
(3.3) 
 
where (Rit – Rft) represents the equal- or value-weighted excess return on calendar-time 
portfolio i in month t, (RMt – Rft) is the market risk premium for month t, SMBt is the 
return on a zero-investment portfolio that is long small stocks and short large stocks for 
month t, HMLt is the return on a zero-investment portfolio that is long high book-to-
market (value) stocks and short low book-to-market (glamour) stocks for month t, and 
UMDt is the return on a zero-investment portfolio that is long high return stocks and 
short low return stocks for month t.  If the Carhart (1997) four-factor model is a perfect 
description of expected returns, the intercept (α) is a measure of risk-adjusted abnormal 
firm performance that is tested with a standard t-statistic.   
 Portfolios of subsamples of event firms are then constructed on the basis of the 
following characteristics: form of the deal (merger vs. tender offer), method of payment 
(cash vs. stock), book-to-market equity ratio (value vs. glamour), corporate focus 
(focusing vs. diversifying), compensation (high vs. low equity incentive pay), officer 
and director ownership (high vs. low levels of insider ownership), and institutional 
ownership (high vs. low institutional ownership). 
 
A deal is characterized as a merger or tender offer based upon the designation 
provided by SDC in the mergers and acquisitions database.   
SDC also provides data on the method of payment used to finance the 
transaction.  A deal is labeled as “cash” if it is all cash financed, “shares” if stock 
financing is used, “hybrid” if both cash and shares are offered and “other” if the deal 
involves an alternative method of financing (e.g. preferred shares or some other 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) itititiftMtiiftit UMDuHMLhSMBsRRbRR εα ++++−+=−
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instrument).  The delineation above compares deals involving any level of equity at all 
versus those using no common equity.  Categorization of this design biases against the 
possibility of finding any results for cash versus stock deals, but as I will show, the 
effect is still large enough to overcome the bias. 
Value acquirers are those whose book-to-market equity ratio (immediately prior 
to the merger announcement) is above the median value for the sample while glamour 
acquirers are those with a book-to-market equity ratio below the sample median.  To 
control for temporal changes in the book-to-market ratio of sample firms, I calculate this 
measure year by year. 
A focusing acquisition is defined as one in which both the acquirer and target 
are within the same two-digit SIC code as identified by CRSP.  While somewhat crude, 
this measure has been used extensively in the merger literature to capture the effects of 
diversification (see for example Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) or Gregory 
(1997)). 
For the three governance variables (Comp, InsideOwn and InstOwn) I also use 
median values to determine breakpoints for analysis.  For example, firms with values of 
Comp that are higher than the sample median are regarded as having a greater level of 
performance-based pay.  Firms below the median are regarded as having a lesser level 
of performance-based pay.  The same classifications are used for InsideOwn and 
InstOwn.  As with determining value or glamour deals, all determinations are made on 
a yearly basis to overcome temporal changes in the governance characteristics through 
time. 
Significance of the differences between the above groups of subsamples is 
determined via a single regression using the following procedure.  Equation (3.3) is 
estimated for each of the subsamples.  For example, equations (3.4) and (3.5) represent 
equation (3.3) for the subsamples of cash and stock acquirers respectively.   
 
(3.4) 
(3.5) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) StStStSftMtSSftSt UMDuHMLhSMBsRRbRR εα ++++−+=− )(
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) CtCtCtCftMtCCftCt UMDuHMLhSMBsRRbRR εα ++++−+=−
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where subscripts S and C and represent cash and stock respectively.  Subtracting 
equation (3.4) from (3.5) yields 
 
 
(3.6) 
 
 
where RCt and RSt represent the mean return of the cash and stock portfolios, and α*, b*, 
s* and h* represent the difference in the respective parameters of specifications (3.4) and 
(3.5).  The regression specified in equation (3.6) is then performed.  Statistical inference 
of the difference between αS in equation (3.4) and αC in equation (3.5) is then made by 
conducting the following test: 
 
 H0: α*=0. (3.7) 
 
The procedure is repeated for each of the subsamples listed above. 
 
Multivariate Analysis: A major contribution of this paper is to analyze the cross-
sectional dispersion of long-run firm abnormal returns after the completion of a merger.   
As such, the portfolio alphas calculated in calendar-time above are not a sufficient 
measure for inferences about individual firms.  Instead, an individual firm measure of 
abnormal returns is needed.  Proper measurement of abnormal return performance is 
crucial.  As described in chapter II, researchers have used a wide variety of benchmarks 
and return metrics in order to calculate abnormal returns in tests of market efficiency; 
however, it remains an open-ended question as to the appropriate measure to use on 
the left hand side of an explanatory regression in an effort to infer something about the 
cross-sectional variation in abnormal returns.  All that is known is that the best measure 
of market efficiency is an ineffective left hand side specification.  As an alternative, this 
paper utilizes several measures.  Reported figures, however, use the value-weighted 
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cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the combined firms over and above the value-
weighted market return on a 60-month post-merger horizon.  Robustness of this 
measure is discussed later and summarized in a later table.   
 In order to gauge the importance of corporate governance in the cross-section of 
long-run post-merger returns, the value-weighted CAR is used as the dependent 
variable in a multivariate regression.  Equation (3.8) provides the specification: 
 
                                    (3.8) 
 
where CARit is the cumulative abnormal return of firm i from month (completion+1) to 
month (completion+60), αi is a constant and Xt-1 is a matrix of governance variables 
including Comp, InsideOwn and InstOwn.  Zt-1 is a set of control variables including, 
TotalAssets defined as the book value of assets as of the most recent Compustat entry, 
RelSize defined as the market capitalization of the target divided by the market 
capitalization of the acquirer, the book-to-market equity ratio of the acquirer (B/M), 
Diversify which is an indicator equal to one identifying diversifying acquisitions, an 
indicator for Stock as method of payment and an indicator variable indicating a tender 
offer (Tend). 
 TotalAssets is intended to control for the effect of firm size without creating a 
potential multicollinearity problem with the other two variables that utilize market 
capitalization of the acquirer.  RelSize is included to account for the fact that the relative 
size of the bidder and target may affect long-run stock returns.  One expects a relatively 
small target (small relative to the size of the bidder) to have less of an effect on the long-
run returns of the combined firm than a target that is larger relative to the size of the 
acquirer. 
 Acquirer book-to-market equity (B/M) is included because Lakonishok, Shliefer 
and Vishny (1994) find that value firms (those with high book-to-market equity) 
outperform glamour firms (those with low book-to-market equity).  They submit that 
this result is consistent with a performance extrapolation hypothesis whereby investors 
extrapolate recent performance too far into the future.  Eventually, stock prices revert to 
ititiiit uZXCAR +++= −− 11 '' δβα
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true fundamentals, causing the result.  Rau and Vermaelen (1998) report that value 
acquirers also overperform glamour acquirers, but Megginson, Morgan and Nail (2003) 
find no significant difference between the two groups of acquirers. 
 I include an indicator variable denoting acquisitions that are diversifying in 
nature.  Diversification is determined by the two-digit SIC code of both parties.  The 
precedence for the use of this measure is Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) and 
Gregory (1997); however, Megginson, Morgan, and Nail (2003) create a continuous 
herfindal index that incorporates multiple business segments of both the acquirer and 
target.  They report that focusing acquisitions overperform those that are diversifying in 
nature.  Gregory (1997) finds no significant difference between diversifying and 
focusing acquisitions, and although they do not formally test their statement, Agrawal, 
Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992) report that conglomerate based mergers actually 
outperform non-conglomerate merger when diversification is measured via a four-digit 
SIC code.   
 A dummy variable for equity as method of payment is also included.  Myers 
and Majluf (1984) demonstrate that in an economy characterized by asymmetric 
information, managers will only issue stock when it is overvalued.  Loughran and Vijh 
(1997) and Megginson, Morgan and Nail (2003) find that cash acquirers outperform 
stock acquirers on a long-run horizon; however, Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) find 
no significance between the two subsamples. 
 Previous research also motivates the inclusion of a dummy for how the deal is 
structured.  Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) and Loughran and Vijh (1997) find 
that tender offers outperform mergers potentially because of the disciplining effect of 
tender offers versus direct negotiations in mergers. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
 
4.1 Announcement Date Market Reaction 
 Results for the announcement date event study are reported in table 4.  Panel A 
reports the results for the full sample of acquirers.  The mean abnormal return on the 
date of merger announcement is a significant -1.02% (t=-4.62).  The median abnormal 
return is also a significant -0.66% (p<0.001).  These results are similar to the short-run 
event studies summarized by Jensen and Ruback (1983) in which a majority of 
researchers report slightly negative reactions to merger announcements.  Of course the 
explanation of this finding is still a topic of hot debate.  Auction theory suggests that 
bidders suffer from the “winner’s curse” and overpay for targets because the true value 
of the combined entity is not known at the time of the bid.  Roll’s (1986) hubris 
hypothesis suggests that acquiring managers overpay for target firms because of their 
tendency to overvalue their own managerial ability.  Under either of these 
circumstances, the market value of the acquirer has the potential to fall, regardless of 
whether or not actual operating synergies are created because too much of the created 
value is ceded to the target firm. 
 The remainder of table 4 provides results for subsamples defined as low versus 
high levels of incentive compensation (Comp), low versus high levels of insider 
ownership (InsideOwn) and low versus high levels of institutional ownership 
(InstOwn).  Again, a firm is considered to have a high level of the variable if the 
variable takes a value that is greater than the sample median during the year prior to 
the announcement date.  An interesting and consistent pattern emerges in panels B 
through G of table 4. 
Panels B and C provide the mean abnormal return for acquirers with low and 
high levels of incentive compensation respectively.  Firms determined to have low 
levels of equity incentives have a -0.82% (t=-2.76) abnormal return on average while 
firms with high levels of equity incentive compensation have a mean abnormal return 
of -1.21% (t=-3.74).  It is interesting to note that the market reaction to the acquirers with 
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greater levels of incentive compensation is worse than the reaction to the group of 
acquirer with lower levels of incentive compensation; however, the difference between 
the two subgroups is an insignificant 0.38% (t=0.87).  
Panels D and E provide the mean abnormal return for acquirers with low and 
high levels of insider ownership (InsideOwn) respectively.  Firms with low levels of 
insider ownership have a -0.73% (t=-2.42) abnormal return on average while firms with 
high levels of insider ownership have a mean abnormal return of -1.26% (t=-3.22).  The 
difference between the two subgroups, however, is once again an insignificant 0.53% 
(t=1.07). 
 
Table 4 
Announcement Date Market Reactions to Mergers. 
 
Abnormal (market-adjusted) returns are calculated for sample firms in event time.  Day zero is the 
announcement date of the deal as specified in the Securities Data Corporation Mergers and Acquisitions 
Database.  Panel A provides results for the full sample of firms.  Panels B and C provide results for the 
subsamples of firms identified as having low and high levels of equity incentive compensation.  Panel D 
and E provide results for the subsamples of firms identified as having low and high levels of insider 
ownership.  Finally, panels F and G provide results for the subsamples of firms identified as having low 
and high levels of institutional ownership.  Firms are categorized as having high or low levels of the 
characteristics in relation to the sample median in each year.  
 
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
         
Day N 
Mean 
AR t-stat Prob > |t|  
Median 
AR Wilcoxon S Prob > |s| 
-10 484 0.001250   0.8845   0.377  0.001450 2036.0   0.509 
-9 484 0.001242   0.9579   0.339  0.001230 2729.0   0.376 
-8 484 0.003019   2.1727   0.030  0.000928 3899.0   0.206 
-7 484 0.002427   1.8649   0.063  0.003673 7203.0   0.019 
-6 484 0.001598   1.2011   0.230  -0.000188 1203.0   0.696 
-5 484 0.001784   1.0697   0.285  -0.000332 1069.0   0.729 
-4 484 0.000060   0.0461   0.963  -0.001344 -1211.0   0.694 
-3 484 -0.000012   -0.0100   0.992  -0.000851 -1150.0   0.709 
-2 484 -0.001613   -1.2115   0.226  -0.001633 -5689.0   0.065 
-1 484 -0.000802   -0.6102   0.542  -0.001229 -4053.0   0.188 
0 484 -0.010163   -4.6241   <.001  -0.006579 -14218.0   <.001 
1 484 -0.000644   -0.3321   0.740  -0.000363 -1014.0   0.742 
2 484 0.001806   1.2656   0.206  -0.000875   6.0   0.998 
3 484 0.000551   0.4332   0.665  -0.001328 -895.0   0.772 
4 484 -0.000063   -0.0477   0.962  -0.001321 -2194.0   0.477 
5 484 0.000691   0.4796   0.632  -0.000861 -3647.0   0.237 
6 484 -0.000187   -0.1676   0.867  -0.000833 -2321.0   0.451 
7 484 0.001714   1.4526   0.147  0.000431 3596.0   0.243 
8 484 0.001124   0.8818   0.378  -0.000486 668.0   0.828 
9 484 -0.000379   -0.3293   0.742  -0.001983 -5164.0   0.093 
10 484 -0.002585   -1.7453   0.082  -0.001909 -6610.0   0.032 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Low level of incentive compensation 
         
Day N 
Mean 
AR t-stat Prob > |t|  
Median 
AR Wilcoxon S Prob > |s| 
-10 240 0.001554   0.7396   0.460        0.003264 895.0   0.407 
-9 240 0.002108   1.1326   0.259        0.000825 909.0   0.400 
-8 240 0.003391   2.0159   0.045        0.001184 1503.0   0.163 
-7 240 0.002635   1.4563   0.147        0.003638 1950.0   0.070 
-6 240 0.000311   0.2037   0.839        -0.000021 187.0   0.863 
-5 240 0.000974   0.4535   0.651        -0.001044 346.0   0.749 
-4 240 0.000208   0.1200   0.905        -0.001204 -121.0   0.911 
-3 240 0.002689   1.6614   0.098        0.001273 1032.0   0.339 
-2 240 -0.002092   -1.1013   0.272        -0.001189 -1500.0   0.164 
-1 240 -0.001906 -1.1589   0.248        -0.002190 -1432.0   0.184 
0 240 -0.008240   -2.7563   0.006        -0.005323 -3422.0   0.001 
1 240 0.002112   0.7742   0.440        -0.000094 718.0   0.506 
2 240 0.002868   1.3302   0.185        -0.001665 -10.0   0.993 
3 240 -0.001461   -0.8855   0.377        -0.003290 -1607.0   0.136 
4 240 0.001075   0.5362   0.592        -0.001249 -44.0   0.968 
5 240 0.002456   1.0546   0.293        -0.000606 -579.0   0.592 
6 240 -0.000502   -0.3067   0.759        -0.003287 -1502.0   0.163 
7 240 0.001697   1.0223   0.308        0.000089 705.0   0.514 
8 240 0.002608   1.4554   0.147        0.002007 1399.0   0.194 
9 240 0.000500   0.3176   0.751        -0.001555 -776.0   0.472 
10 240 0.001060   0.6290   0.530        -0.000274   22.0   0.984 
 
 
Panel C: High level of incentive compensation 
         
Day N 
Mean 
AR t-stat Prob > |t|  
Median 
AR Wilcoxon S Prob > |s| 
-10 244 0.000952   0.5012   0.617        -0.000081   73.0   0.947 
-9 244 0.000390   0.2156   0.829        0.002468 421.0   0.704 
-8 244 0.002653   1.2018   0.231        0.000818 446.0   0.687 
-7 244 0.002222   1.1861   0.237        0.003673 1609.0   0.145 
-6 244 0.002864   1.3191   0.188        -0.001702 460.0   0.678 
-5 244 0.002582   1.0124   0.312        0.000194 227.0   0.838 
-4 244 -0.000086   -0.0440   0.965        -0.001484 -512.0   0.644 
-3 244 -0.002668   -1.5728   0.117        -0.001872 -1575.0   0.154 
-2 244 -0.001142   -0.6106   0.542        -0.002324 -1356.0   0.220 
-1 244 0.000283   0.1383   0.890        -0.000082 -564.0   0.610 
0 244 -0.012054   -3.7435   <.001        -0.007637 -3713.0   <.001 
1 244 -0.003355   -1.2202   0.224        -0.000566 -1240.0   0.262 
2 244 0.000760   0.4054   0.686        -0.000716   13.0   0.991 
3 244 0.002530   1.3148   0.190        0.000928 1060.0   0.338 
4 244 -0.001183   -0.6883   0.492        -0.002021 -1075.0   0.331 
5 244 -0.001045   -0.6121   0.541        -0.001479 -1198.0   0.279 
6 244 0.000123   0.0813   0.935        0.000472 266.0   0.810 
7 244 0.001730   1.0300   0.304        0.000834 1097.0   0.321 
8 244 -0.000336   -0.1852   0.853        -0.004343 -1104.0   0.318 
9 244 -0.001243   -0.7396   0.460        -0.002421 -1846.0   0.094 
10 244 -0.006170   -2.5628   0.011        -0.004514 -3298.0   0.003 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Panel D: Low level of insider ownership 
         
Day N 
Mean 
AR t-stat Prob > |t|  
Median 
AR Wilcoxon S Prob > |s| 
-10 192 0.000133   0.0699   0.944        0.000209 114.0   0.883 
-9 192 0.002491   1.3306   0.185        0.003079 712.0   0.357 
-8 192 0.001430   0.8106   0.419        0.000928 437.0   0.572 
-7 192 0.002405   1.5023   0.135        0.003144 1206.0   0.118 
-6 192 0.000087   0.0521   0.958        -0.000783 -14.0   0.986 
-5 192 0.000712   0.3008   0.764        -0.001147 -310.0   0.689 
-4 192 0.000329   0.1858   0.853        0.001784 -176.0   0.820 
-3 192 -0.001105   -0.6999   0.485        -0.000696 -431.0   0.577 
-2 192 -0.000196   -0.1052   0.916        -0.001276 -508.0   0.511 
-1 192 0.001674   0.8937   0.373        -0.000170 236.0   0.760 
0 192 -0.007292   -2.4223   0.016        -0.005588 -2151.0   0.005 
1 192 0.000013   0.0060   0.995        -0.000363   92.0   0.905 
2 192 0.003049   1.5743   0.117        0.002163 875.0   0.257 
3 192 -0.000204   -0.1299   0.897        -0.000100 -25.0   0.974 
4 192 -0.000847   -0.4752   0.635        -0.002382 -790.0   0.307 
5 192 -0.001670   -0.9800   0.328        -0.003188 -1003.0   0.194 
6 192 -0.001247   -0.8480   0.397        -0.002309 -844.0   0.275 
7 192 -0.000389   -0.2459   0.806        0.000237 -131.0   0.866 
8 192 0.001439   0.8001   0.425        -0.000619 173.0   0.823 
9 192 0.000472   0.2788   0.781        -0.001479 -157.0   0.839 
10 192 -0.000226   -0.1124   0.911        -0.000317 -283.0   0.715 
 
 
Panel E: High level of insider ownership 
         
Day N 
Mean 
AR t-stat Prob > |t|  
Median 
AR Wilcoxon S Prob > |s| 
-10 198 0.003998   1.5418   0.125        0.002058 872.5   0.281 
-9 198 -0.000940   -0.4301   0.668        -0.001076 -93.5   0.908 
-8 198 0.005953   2.4833   0.014         0.001946 1337.5   0.098 
-7 198 0.002261   0.9417   0.347        0.004260 1040.5   0.198 
-6 198 0.001960   0.8097   0.419        -0.000495 221.5   0.785 
-5 198 0.000208   0.0696   0.945        -0.000872 -298.5   0.713 
-4 198 0.001622   0.6983   0.486        -0.001243 328.5   0.685 
-3 198 -0.000222   -0.1067   0.915      -0.001220 -518.5   0.522 
-2 198 -0.001818   -0.7667   0.444        -0.003167 -1189.5   0.141 
-1 198 -0.002651   -1.1046   0.271        -0.001229 -1300.5   0.107 
0 198 -0.012565   -3.2165   0.002        -0.008631 -2686.5   <.001 
1 198 0.000166   0.0441   0.965        -0.000830 -223.5   0.783 
2 198 0.001007   0.3707   0.711        -0.004654 -857.5   0.289 
3 198 -0.000137   -0.0572   0.954        -0.003717 -694.5   0.391 
4 198 0.000408   0.1649   0.869        -0.002496 -179.5   0.825 
5 198 0.004613   1.6158   0.108        -0.001790 -180.5   0.824 
6 198 -0.000489   -0.2516   0.802        0.000257 -458.5   0.571 
7 198 0.004546   2.1780   0.031        0.000721 1275.5   0.114 
8 198 0.002344   1.0519   0.294        0.000575 420.5   0.604 
9 198 -0.001881   -0.9221   0.358        -0.004345 -1984.5   0.014 
10 198 -0.005232   -1.9090   0.058        -0.002963 -1935.5   0.016 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Panel F: Low level of institutional ownership 
         
Day N 
Mean 
AR t-stat Prob > |t|  
Median 
AR Wilcoxon S Prob > |s| 
-10 212 0.004287   2.0018   0.047        0.003338 1820.0   0.042 
-9 212 0.000065   0.0352   0.972        0.000801 -65.0   0.942 
-8 212 0.005858   2.8284   0.005        0.001578 1974.0   0.027 
-7 212 0.002302   1.0991   0.273        0.004555 1398.0   0.118 
-6 212 -0.000699   -0.3817   0.703        -0.001939 -923.0   0.303 
-5 212 0.005273   2.1494   0.033        0.002345 2497.0   0.005 
-4 212 -0.000212   -0.1161   0.908        -0.003247 -833.0   0.353 
-3 212 0.001477   0.8420   0.401        0.000772 246.0   0.784 
-2 212 -0.000660   -0.3250   0.746        -0.001733 -779.0   0.385 
-1 212 -0.002816   -1.3944   0.165        -0.003845 -2411.0   0.007 
0 212 -0.002672   -0.8018   0.424        -0.001648 -700.0   0.435 
1 212 -0.001025   -0.3140   0.754        0.000125 -149.0   0.868 
2 212 0.001634   0.6947   0.488        -0.002541 -757.0   0.399 
3 212 0.000452   0.2401   0.810        -0.001726 -339.0   0.706 
4 212 -0.000119   -0.0523   0.958        -0.001060 -640.0   0.475 
5 212 0.001886   0.8761   0.382        -0.000597 -485.0   0.589 
6 212 0.001318   0.7934   0.428        -0.000254 -103.0   0.909 
7 212 0.003099   1.8793   0.062        0.002348 1595.0   0.074 
8 212 0.001578   0.7317   0.465        -0.000137   72.0   0.936 
9 212 -0.000683   -0.3936   0.694        -0.001543 -1235.0   0.168 
10 212 0.000199   0.1057   0.916        0.000470 169.0   0.851 
 
 
Panel G: High level of institutional ownership 
         
Day N 
Mean 
AR t-stat Prob > |t|  
Median 
AR Wilcoxon S Prob > |s| 
-10 217 -0.002788   -1.4437   0.150        0.000244 -926.5   0.318 
-9 217 0.000117   0.0601   0.952        0.001147 279.5   0.764 
-8 217 -0.001129   -0.6070   0.544        -0.000021 -606.5   0.514 
-7 217 0.002781   1.5091   0.133        0.003242 1532.5   0.098 
-6 217 0.003242   1.4958   0.136        0.000811 768.5   0.408 
-5 217 0.001257   0.4934   0.622        -0.001483 -1389.5   0.134 
-4 217 0.001451   0.6989   0.485        0.002200 629.5   0.498 
-3 217 -0.001561   -0.8629   0.389        -0.001179 -676.5   0.466 
-2 217 -0.003359   -1.6963   0.091        -0.003278 -2049.5   0.027 
-1 217 -0.001295   -0.6336   0.527        -0.001078 -803.5   0.387 
0 217 -0.016078   -4.8126   <.001        -0.010323 -4217.5   <.001 
1 217 0.001105   0.4288   0.669        -0.000194 277.5   0.765 
2 217 0.001842   0.9331   0.352        -0.000233 616.5   0.507 
3 217 0.001773   0.8924   0.373        0.001387 605.5   0.514 
4 217 0.000379   0.2116   0.833        -0.000635 108.5   0.907 
5 217 -0.000027   -0.0123   0.990        -0.001187 -912.5   0.326 
6 217 -0.000767   -0.4743   0.636        -0.000877 -448.5   0.629 
7 217 -0.000919   -0.5007   0.617        -0.000696 -432.5   0.642 
8 217 0.001058   0.6281   0.531        -0.000936 182.5   0.844 
9 217 -0.000286   -0.1680   0.867        -0.002555 -906.5   0.329 
10 217 -0.005432   -2.1719   0.031        -0.003744 -2683.5   0.004 
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Panels F and G provide the mean abnormal return for acquirers with low and 
high levels of institutional ownership (InstOwn).  Firms with low levels of institutional 
ownership have an insignificant -0.27% (t=-0.80) abnormal return on average while 
firms with high levels of institutional ownership have a significant abnormal return of -
1.61% (t=-4.81) on average.  Consistent with the two previous univariate cuts of the 
sample, the market reaction to the acquirers with greater levels of institutional 
ownership is worse than the reaction to the group of acquirer with lower levels of 
institutional ownership.  In this instance, though, the difference between the two 
subgroups is a significant 1.34% (t=2.84). 
In sum, the market reacts negatively to the revelation of corporate control 
activity for acquirers.  This reaction appears to be even more negative for firms with 
high levels of institutional ownership, but there exists no significant difference in the 
reactions of high versus low equity incentive acquirers or in the reactions of low versus 
high insider ownership acquirers.   
Tables 5 and 6 provide multivariate regressions of the announcement date 
abnormal returns on the governance characteristics and various controls.   Specifically, 
equation 3.8 is conducted with the announcement day market-adjusted return as the 
dependant variable in lieu of the long-run CAR.  Table 5 reveals that deals in which 
equity is offered as consideration and deals structured as tender offers have a negative 
impact on the announcement day return regardless of the specification examined.  In 
specification (6), the variable Stock has a coefficient of -2.361 (t=-3.19) and the variable 
Tend has a coefficient of -1.792 (t=-2.34).  The remaining control variables Total Assets, 
RelSize, B/M and Diversify do not appear to significantly impact the market reaction.  
The univariate results for the governance characteristics are confirmed in the 
announcement date multivariate regressions.  Equation 2 shows that when considered 
in isolation, incentive compensation (Comp) enters the regression negatively; however, 
when all governance characteristics are included (equation (6)), the negative effect of 
higher levels of incentive compensation disappears.  Neither InsideOwn nor its square 
enter the model significantly in any instance.    Higher levels of institutional ownership, 
indicated by the square of InstOwn, have a statistically significant detrimental effect on 
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the market’s reception of the announcement.  In equation (6), the coefficient on the 
square of InstOwn is -0.001 (t=-1.73).  Although statistically significant, it is not clear 
that this is an economically meaningful number.  In the univariate results, the difference 
in announcement date returns for groups of low versus high institutional ownership 
acquirers was a significant 1.34%; however, a squared term is included in the 
multivariate setting in order to allow for any nonlinearity.   
 Finally, table 6 incorporates the formation of two governance indices.  The first 
index, G, is a linear function of indicator variables for high versus low levels of the 
governance characteristic.  When G is used in the regression instead of the individual 
governance dummies, it enters with a significantly negative coefficient of -0.864 (t=-
2.72), indicating that the market reacts more negatively to acquirers with “good” 
governance (see equation (1)).  The other index is that of Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 
(2003), GIM.  This variable is also a linear function of shareholder friendly corporate 
charter characteristics.  This index does not appear to have any effect on the market’s 
reaction.  The coefficient on GIM in specification (3) is -0.089 (t=-1.13).   
In summary, there is evidence that the market reacts more negatively to merger 
news for acquirers with “good” governance characteristics than to those acquirers with 
less shareholder friendly internal governance.  The best evidence of this comes from the 
significant impact of the governance index, G, on the announcement date abnormal 
returns.  This influence appears to be driven mostly by the negative reception of 
acquirers with high levels of institutional ownership and to a lesser extent by acquirers 
with higher levels of incentive equity compensation.  Perhaps this result is due to the 
fact that firms with good governance are rewarded in valuation and the market 
reclaims this reward when information of a takeover arrives.  The evidence on 
governance and firm value suggests that this is entirely possible (see Morck, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990)).  This is an interesting question 
in its own right and is worthy of future research. 
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Table 5 
Multivariate Regressions of Announcement Date Abnormal Returns. 
 
Announcement date abnormal returns are regressed on a set of governance variables and controls.  
Abnormal returns are calculated as the market-adjusted return on the date of public announcement using 
the CRSP value-weighted index including all distributions.  Governance variables include Comp defined as 
the percentage of CEO compensation consisting of equity incentives during the twelve months prior to the 
merger announcement.  InsideOwn is the percentage ownership of all officers and directors as reported by 
Compact Disclosure within twelve months prior to the announcement of the merger.  InstOwn is the 
percentage ownership of institutional investors as reported by 13-F filings to the SEC in the twelve months 
prior to the announcement.  Control variables include Stock which is an indicator equal to one if the 
acquirer used equity as all or as a portion of the consideration.  Tend is an indicator equal to one if the deal 
is structured as a tender offer.  RelSize is the size of the target relative to that of the acquirer.  B/M is the 
book to market ratio of the acquirer.  Diversify is an indicator variable equal to one if acquirer and target 
have different two-digit SIC codes.  T-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 0.745 -0.630 1.348 0.987 -0.020 1.293
(1.13) (-0.31) (1.81) a (1.26) (-0.01) (0.60)
Total Assets 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.01) (-1.03) (0.19) (-0.43) (-0.49) (-1.14)
RelSize -0.052 -0.11 -0.568 -0.209 -0.568
(-0.05) (-0.11) (-0.44) (-0.19) (-0.41)
B/M 0.386 0.229 1.322 0.687 1.371
(0.43) (0.25) (1.27) (0.68) (1.17)
Diversify 0.071 0.093 -0.001 0.298 0.260
(0.16) (0.21) (-0.00) (0.63) (0.49)
Stock -2.491 -2.482 -2.546 -2.234 -2.361
(-4.06) c (-4.05) c (-3.74) c (-3.36) c (-3.19) c
Tend -1.235 -1.260 -1.647 -1.167 -1.792
(-1.90) a (-1.94) a (-2.31) b (-1.66) a (-2.34) b
Comp -1.397 -1.210 -1.473
(-1.53) (-1.73) a (-1.59)
InsideOwn -0.001 -0.054 -0.093
(-1.48) (-1.00) (-1.60)
InsideOwnSq 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.87) (1.01) (1.06)
InstOwn 0.093 0.066 0.075
(1.44) (1.21) (1.18)
InstOwnSq -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-2.03) b (-1.78) a (-1.73) a
N 484 345 484 390 429 345
Adj R2 0.0268 0.0253 0.0309 0.0261 0.0383 0.0507
 
 
a,b,c Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively 
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Table 6 
Alternative Announcement Date Abnormal Return Regression Specifications. 
 
Announcement day abnormal returns are regressed on a set of governance variables and controls.  
Abnormal returns are calculated as the market-adjusted return using the CRSP value-weighted index 
including all distributions.  Total Assets is the book value of the firm’s assets as of the most recent 
Compustat listing.  RelSize is the size of the target relative to that of the acquirer.  B/M is the book to market 
ratio of the acquirer.  Diversify is an indicator variable equal to one if acquirer and target have different two-
digit SIC codes.  Stock is an indicator equal to one if the acquirer used equity as all or as a portion of the 
consideration.  Tend is an dummy equal to one if the deal is structured as a tender offer.  G is a governance 
index constructed using the governance characteristics of high or low levels of equity incentive 
compensation, insider ownership and institutional ownership.  GIM is the index of Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick (2003) if available within the twelve months prior to the announcement.  T-stats are in parentheses. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 2.199 2.056 2.374 3.282
(2.33) b (1.79) a (2.35) b (2.03) b
Total Assets -0.000 -0.000 -0.0000 -0.000
(-1.12) (-1.13) (-0.29) (-0.33)
RelSize -0.553 -0.774 0.165 0.122
(-0.41) (-0.57) (0.15) (0.11)
B/M 1.188 1.260 -0.951 -0.990
(1.05) (1.11) (-0.98) (-1.01)
Diversify 0.143 -1.138 -0.183 -1.121
(0.27) (-1.04) (-0.41) (-0.73)
Stock -2.406 -1.156 -2.668 -3.307
(-3.30) c (-0.98) (-4.32) c (-2.03) b
Tend -1.860 -1.907 -1.693 -1.704
(-2.43) b (-2.50) b (-2.60) c (-2.61) c
G -0.864 -0.685
(-2.72) c (-1.19)
G*Diversify 0.819
(1.29)
G*Stock -0.839
(-1.32)
GIM -0.089 -0.184
(-1.13) (-1.20)
GIM*Diversify 0.103
(0.65)
GIM*Stock 0.070
(0.44)
N 345 345 364 364
Adj R2 0.0447 0.0510 0.0360 0.0321
 
 
a,b,c Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively 
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4.2 Calendar-Time Results 
 Calendar-time regression results are presented in table 7.   Panels A, B and C 
present the results for a twelve, thirty-six and sixty month post-merger horizon 
respectively.  On a twelve month horizon, the monthly alpha for the full sample of 
acquirers using equally-weighted (EW) portfolios is an insignificant 0.17% (t=0.67).  The 
value-weighted (VW) portfolios, however, exhibit a statistically positive abnormal 
monthly drift of 0.76% (t=2.26), or 9.12% for the twelve month post-merger period.  
Therefore, larger acquirers appear to do abnormally well on a risk-adjusted basis over 
the twelve months following merger completion. 
 For the subsamples of firms analyzed in calendar-time, there is further evidence 
of abnormal performance; however, there is little evidence that the subsamples of 
interest perform differently from their control group.  For example, the VW portfolios 
of acquirers who structure deals as tender offers have a positive and significant 
monthly alpha of 1.24% (t=2.15), but the VW tender offer portfolio fails to outperform 
the VW portfolio of acquirers who structured the deal as a merger.  The difference 
between the two alphas is an insignificant 0.77% (t=1.17).  Other subgroups that 
overperform on a risk-adjusted basis but do not overperform their counterparts on a 
twelve-month horizon include cash acquirers [α=0.89% (t=1.73)], focusing acquirers 
[α=1.00% (t=1.93)], low incentive compensation acquirers [α=0.84% (t=1.77)], high 
insider ownership acquirers [α=1.41% (t=2.04)] and low institutional ownership 
acquirers [α=0.99% (t=2.01)].  The only subsample of VW portfolios that outperforms its 
control group on a twelve month horizon is the portfolio of glamour acquirers [α=1.12% 
(t=2.39)], which outperforms the VW portfolio of value acquirers by 1.44% (t=2.02) per 
month.  While the EW portfolio of glamour acquirers also demonstrates a positive drift 
of 0.66% (t=1.76), it does not outperform the EW portfolio of value acquirers.  There is 
no other evidence of abnormal performance by any EW portfolio on a twelve-month 
horizon.  
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Table 7 
Calendar-Time Carhart (1997) Regression Results. 
 
Returns are calculated for equally-weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) portfolios of sample firms, 
constructed by including all firms which have completed a merger or tender offer transaction in the prior 
12, 36 or 60 months respectively.  Excess returns of the portfolios are then regressed on the Carhart (1997) 
factors.  Alphas from the time-series regression of monthly portfolio excess returns are reported. Difference 
represents the difference between the alpha of the top category less the alpha of the bottom category as 
specified in equation (3.7).  t-stats are in parentheses.  A minimum of ten (10) firms is required in the 
portfolio for inclusion in the time-series regression. 
 
Panel A: 12-month Horizon 
 Equally-weighted Portfolios Value-weighted Portfolios 
 αˆ  
(t-stat) 
Adjusted R2 
[Months] 
Difference 
(t-stat) 
αˆ  
(t-stat) 
Adjusted R2 
[Months] 
Difference 
(t-stat) 
       
Full Sample 0.0017 
 (0.67) 
.86 
[96] 
 0.0076 
(2.26)b 
.78 
[96] 
 
       
Tender Offers 
 
0.0054 
(1.30) 
.75 
[68] 
 0.0124 
(2.15)b 
.59 
[68] 
 
       
Mergers 
 
0.0021 
(0.70) 
.90 
[68] 
0.0032 
(0.75) 
0.0046 
(1.00) 
.81 
[68] 
0.0077  
(1.17) 
       
Cash Acquirers 0.0054 
(1.52) 
.79 
[71] 
 0.0089 
(1.73)a 
.62 
[71] 
 
       
Stock Acquirers 0.0022 
(0.67) 
.88 
[71] 
0.0032 
(0.78) 
0.0062 
(1.34) 
.79 
[71] 
0.0028 
(0.47) 
       
Value Acquirers 
(High B/M) 
-0.0008 
(-0.21) 
.77 
[76] 
 -0.0032 
(-0.55) 
.56 
[76] 
 
       
Glamour Acquirers  
(Low B/M) 
0.0066 
(1.76)a 
.85 
[76] 
-0.0074 
(-1.35) 
0.0112 
(2.39)b 
.76 
[76] 
-0.0144 
(-2.02)b 
       
Focusing Acquisitions 
 
0.0024 
(0.73) 
.84 
[76] 
 0.0100 
(1.93)a 
.72 
[76] 
 
       
Diversifying Acquisitions 
 
0.0024 
(0.65) 
.82 
[76] 
0.0000 
(0.02) 
0.0059 
(1.23) 
.68 
[76] 
0.0041 
(0.63) 
       
High Incentive 
Compensation 
0.0038 
(1.14) 
.87 
[76] 
 0.0042 
(0.91) 
.80 
[76] 
 
       
Low Incentive 
Compensation 
0.0009 
(0.26) 
.77 
[76] 
0.0029 
(0.68) 
0.0084 
(1.77)a 
.61 
[76] 
-0.0041 
(-0.68) 
       
High Insider Ownership 
 
0.0030 
(0.65) 
.78 
[74] 
 0.0141 
(2.04)b 
.67 
[74] 
 
       
Low Insider Ownership 
 
0.0008 
(0.24) 
.81 
[74] 
0.0022 
(0.39) 
0.0043 
(1.12) 
.75 
[74] 
0.0098 
(1.26) 
       
High Institutional 
Ownership 
0.0007 
(0.20) 
.82 
[76] 
 0.0028 
(0.63) 
.76 
[76] 
 
       
Low Institutional 
Ownership 
0.0051 
(1.66) 
.85 
[76] 
-0.0044 
(-1.06) 
0.0099 
(2.01)b 
.70 
[76] 
-0.0071 
(-1.20) 
       
a,b,c Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively 
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Table 7 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: 36-month Horizon 
 Equally-weighted Portfolios Value-weighted Portfolios 
 αˆ  
(t-stat) 
Adjusted R2 
[Months] 
Difference 
(t-stat) 
αˆ  
(t-stat) 
Adjusted R2 
[Months] 
Difference 
(t-stat) 
       
Full Sample 0.0032 
(1.32) 
.85 
[96] 
 0.0094 
(3.11)c 
.80 
[96] 
 
       
Tender Offers 
 
0.0045 
(1.27) 
.75 
[75] 
 0.0124 
(2.55)b 
.62 
[75] 
 
       
Mergers 
 
0.0038 
(1.36) 
.89 
[75] 
0.0007 
(0.20) 
0.0079 
(2.41)b 
.86 
[75] 
0.0045 
(0.92) 
       
Cash Acquirers 0.0065 
(2.04)b 
.77 
[84] 
 0.0138 
(3.21)c 
.68 
[84] 
 
       
Stock Acquirers 0.0023 
(0.74) 
.85 
[84] 
0.0043 
(1.13) 
0.0061 
(2.04)b 
.86 
[84] 
0.0077 
(1.81)c 
       
Value Acquirers 
(High B/M) 
0.0008 
(0.24) 
.77 
[85] 
 0.0044 
(0.93) 
.58 
[85] 
 
       
Glamour Acquirers  
(Low B/M) 
0.0067 
(2.47)b 
.87 
[85] 
-0.0059 
(-1.59) 
0.0112 
(3.27)c 
.81 
[85] 
-0.0068 
(-1.25) 
       
Focusing Acquisitions 
 
0.0056 
(2.00)b 
.85 
[85] 
 0.0100 
(2.67)c 
.76 
[85] 
 
       
Diversifying Acquisitions 
 
0.0013 
(0.43) 
.83 
[85] 
0.0043 
(1.54) 
0.0083 
(2.25)b 
.77 
[85] 
0.0017 
(0.38) 
       
High Incentive 
Compensation 
0.0036 
(1.24) 
.86 
[85] 
 0.0075 
(1.95)a 
.80 
[85] 
 
       
Low Incentive 
Compensation 
0.0042 
(1.38) 
.79 
[85] 
-0.0006 
(-0.18) 
0.0119 
(3.41)c 
.73 
[85] 
-0.0044 
(-0.93) 
       
High Insider Ownership 
 
0.0040 
(1.04) 
.81 
[84] 
 0.0155 
(2.47)b 
.69 
[84] 
 
       
Low Insider Ownership 
 
0.0045 
(1.58) 
.80 
[84] 
-0.0006 
(-0.16) 
0.0083 
(2.68)c 
.77 
[84] 
0.0072 
(1.08) 
       
High Institutional 
Ownership 
0.0017 
(0.49) 
.80 
[84] 
 0.0075 
(2.03)b 
.77 
[84] 
 
       
Low Institutional 
Ownership 
0.0058 
(2.38)b 
.86 
[84] 
-0.0042 
(-1.33) 
0.0113 
(2.89)c 
.75 
[84] 
-0.0037 
(-0.77) 
       
a,b,c Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively 
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Table 7 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: 60-month Horizon 
 Equally-weighted Portfolios Value-weighted Portfolios 
 αˆ  
(t-stat) 
Adjusted R2 
[Months] 
Difference 
(t-stat) 
αˆ  
(t-stat) 
Adjusted R2 
[Months] 
Difference 
(t-stat) 
       
Full Sample 0.0030 
(1.24) 
.85 
[96] 
 0.0093 
(3.13)c 
.80 
[96] 
 
       
Tender Offers 
 
0.0051 
(1.55) 
.78 
[75] 
 0.0129 
(2.68)c 
.63 
[75] 
 
       
Mergers 
 
0.0033 
(1.15) 
87 
[75] 
0.0019 
(0.52) 
0.0074 
(2.39)b 
.86 
[75] 
0.0055 
(1.19) 
       
Cash Acquirers 0.0063 
(2.10)b 
.80 
[84] 
 0.0139 
(3.27)c 
.68 
[84] 
 
       
Stock Acquirers 0.0021 
(0.66) 
.82 
[84] 
0.0042 
(1.11) 
0.0059 
(2.10)b 
.86 
[84] 
0.0079 
(1.95)c 
       
Value Acquirers 
(High B/M) 
0.0006 
(0.19) 
.78 
[85] 
 0.0051 
(1.10) 
.59 
[85] 
 
       
Glamour Acquirers  
(Low B/M) 
0.0064 
(2.34)b 
.85 
[85] 
-0.0058 
(-1.66) 
0.0110 
(3.29)c 
.81 
[85] 
-0.0059 
(-1.13) 
       
Focusing Acquisitions 
 
0.0057 
(2.08)b 
.84 
[85] 
 0.0100 
(2.74)c 
.76 
[85] 
 
       
Diversifying Acquisitions 
 
0.0005 
(0.18) 
.83 
[85] 
0.0052 
(1.92)c 
0.0081 
(2.32)b 
.78 
[85] 
0.0018 
(0.44) 
       
High Incentive 
Compensation 
0.0034 
(1.16) 
.85 
[85] 
 0.0076 
(2.03)b 
.81 
[85] 
 
       
Low Incentive 
Compensation 
0.0038 
(1.32) 
.80 
[85] 
-0.0005 
(-0.15) 
0.0113 
(3.32)c 
.72 
[85] 
-0.0037 
(-0.81) 
       
High Insider Ownership 
 
0.0033 
(0.92) 
.81 
[84] 
 0.0149 
(2.47)b 
.70 
[84] 
 
       
Low Insider Ownership 
 
0.0049 
(1.78)a 
.80 
[84] 
-0.0017 
(-0.46) 
0.0084 
(2.80)c 
.78 
[84] 
0.0065 
(1.05) 
       
High Institutional 
Ownership 
0.0010 
(0.31) 
.78 
[84] 
 0.0074 
(2.12)b 
.78 
[84] 
 
       
Low Institutional 
Ownership 
0.0059 
(2.41)b 
.86 
[84] 
-0.0049 
(-1.62) 
0.0112 
(3.02)c 
.75 
[84] 
-0.0039 
(-0.87) 
       
a,b,c Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively 
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Panel B of table 7 presents the calendar-time results on a 36-month horizon.  
Again, the VW portfolio of the full sample of acquirers demonstrates a significantly 
positive drift of 0.94% (t=3.11) per month.  This is analogous to an abnormal return of 
33.84% over the full 36-month period.  The EW full sample portfolio fails to exhibit a 
statistically reliable drift. 
 On the 36-month horizon, all but one VW portfolio of the subgroups 
demonstrates abnormal drift.  Only the portfolio of value acquirers fails to perform 
abnormally.  Akin to the 12-month results, only one of the subgroups outperforms its 
control group.  On this horizon, the subsample of cash acquirers overperforms the 
subsample of stock acquirers by 0.77% per month (t=1.81).  This result compares with 
the calendar-time results of Mitchell and Stafford (2000) in which they report that 
acquirers using equity underperform on a 36-month horizon.  The EW calendar-time 
results are, once again, less revealing.  Evidence of reliable abnormal performance is 
found in the subsamples of cash acquirers [α=0.65% (t=2.04)], glamour acquirers 
[α=0.67% (t=2.47)], focusing acquirers [α=0.56% (t=2.00)] and acquirers with low levels 
of institutional ownership [α=0.58% (t=2.38)].  No EW calendar-time portfolio 
outperforms it counterpart. 
  Table 7 concludes with Panel C which provides results on the 60-month period 
after merger completion.  Consistent with the shorter 12 and 36-month horizons, the 
VW calendar-time portfolio for the full sample exhibits a statistically reliable monthly 
alpha of 0.93% (t=3.13) which equates to an abnormal return of 55.8% over the entire 
time period.  Also consistent with the shorter periods, there is no evidence of abnormal 
performance in the EW full sample portfolios. 
 Again, nearly all of the VW subsamples exhibit significantly positive abnormal 
performance.  The only exception is the portfolio of value acquirers with an 
insignificant monthly alpha of 0.51% (t=1.10).  Overperformance in the EW subsample 
portfolios is limited to cash acquirers [α=0.63% (t=2.10)], glamour acquirers [α=0.64% 
(t=2.34)], focusing acquirers [α=0.57% (t=2.08)], acquirers with low levels of insider 
ownership [α=0.49% (t=1.78)] and acquirers with low levels of institutional ownership 
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[α=0.59% (t=2.41)].  This is the first horizon on which there is broad evidence of 
overperformance within EW subsample portfolios.  In fact, the focusing acquisitions 
overperform diversifying acquisitions by 0.52% (t=1.92) per month on an EW basis in 
the subsequent 60 months.  The 60-month calendar-time results are broadly consistent 
with the 60-month buy-and-hold analysis of Megginson, Morgan and Nail (2003) in 
which they report that the main determinants of post-merger performance are 
corporate focus and cash as a method of payment.  
An interesting note on the calendar-time portfolio results is that most of the 
evidence presented suggests abnormal performance in the value-weighted portfolios as 
opposed to the equally-weighted portfolios.  Caution should therefore be used when 
interpreting these results as the sample is somewhat biased toward including the 
largest of acquirers in the first place.  A more accurate interpretation would be that the 
“largest of the large acquirers” demonstrate the patterns documented herein. 
To summarize, the findings of the calendar-time analysis indicate that there is 
evidence of positive drift in the full sample on a VW basis and quite a bit of evidence in 
support of abnormal performance on a risk-adjusted basis for individual subsamples of 
acquiring firms.  However, very little evidence of abnormal performance exists for 
subsamples of acquirers in comparison to their respective controls.  Even this evidence 
is specific to whether or not VW or EW portfolios are used and which horizon is 
examined.  While broadly consistent with other studies, the calendar-time results 
reported here suggest that researchers examine multiple long-term horizons in analysis 
of post-merger stock returns.  While it is somewhat disappointing that the data do not 
support a unified story that is robust across portfolios and horizons, it is important to 
remember that these univariate calendar-time tests do not allow for the combined 
effects of each of the potential determinants.  The multivariate tests that follow present 
a more robust picture. 
 
4.3 Multivariate Results 
 While calendar-time analysis represents the state-of-the-art in methodologies 
designed to test market efficiency on a long horizon, it is far from clear which metric of 
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abnormal returns should be used in conducting a multivariate analysis of long-run 
returns.  Perhaps the calendar-time abnormal return is best specified; however, it does 
not allow for analysis on an individual firm level.  In contrast, a market-adjusted 
cumulative abnormal return, while assuredly misspecified and biased, offers the 
greatest power to detect the determinants of long-run performance.  As such, I have 
chosen to report multivariate results using 60-month market-adjusted CARs as the 
dependent variable in the regression.  The discussion of robustness checks that follows 
provides an explanation of how the results vary with alternate left hand side metrics. 
 Since, the long-run performance metric has now changed for the duration of the 
paper, table 8 provides the univariate relation between the mean 60-month CARs (both 
EW and VW) and their respective subsamples.    For the mean EW CARs, there is a 
significant difference between the large versus small acquirers (defined as above or 
below the sample median on an annual basis) and the diversifying versus focusing 
acquisitions (identified by a difference in 2-digit SIC code).  The difference between the 
mean EW CARs of small acquirers and large acquirers is 21.98% (t=3.15).  The 
difference in means of focusing and diversifying deals is also a significant 15.04% 
(t=2.13).  No other subgroups differ significantly. 
 The univariate relations between subgroup CARs on a VW basis strongly 
mirrors those on an EW basis.  There is a significant difference between the means of 
small and large acquirers of 18.65% (t=2.70) and between the means of focusing and 
diversifying acquirers of 16.34% (t=2.34).  On a VW basis, there is also a difference in 
means of firms using equity and those that do not.  The mean VW CAR of cash 
acquirers is 12.96% (t=1.91) higher than that of acquirers using equity.  No other 
subsamples have significantly different mean VW CARs from those of their control 
group.  These univariate relations foreshadow the multivariate results that follow. 
 Table 9 provides the results for the regression specified in equation 3.8.  The two 
most notable aspects of table 9 are the strongly negative coefficients on the variables 
Diversify and Stock in each of the specifications.  The coefficient on Diversify in 
specification (6) is a significant -18.528 (t=-2.12).  The coefficient on Stock in 
specification (6) is also a significant -22.354 (t=-1.84).  Corporate diversification and use 
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of equity appear to be very large negative determinants of post-merger abnormal stock 
price performance.  Controlling for other factors, these two results confirm the 
univariate relations described above.  Again, these two results are perfectly consistent  
 
Table 8 
Univariate Relation Between Abnormal Returns and Cross-Sectional Variables. 
 
Long-run (60-month) abnormal returns are calculated as the cumulative market-adjusted return on a 
monthly basis using the CRSP equal- and value-weighted indices including all distributions.  Subsamples 
are defined in terms of whether or not observations meet the criteria specified below.  T-statistics are in 
parentheses. 
 
Panel A: Equally-Weighted Results    
 
Yes No 
t-stat for 
Difference 
    
Large acquirer? -9.967 12.011 (3.15) c 
    
High relative size of bidder to target? 4.350 -2.544 (0.98) 
    
High acquirer B/M ratio (Value acquirer)? 0.362 1.510 (0.16) 
    
Diversifying acquisition? -7.585 7.458 (2.13)b 
    
Equity consideration given? -3.173 7.622 (1.56) 
    
Deal structured as a tender offer? 1.677 0.628 (0.15) 
    
High level of incentive compensation for acquirer? 2.900 -1.071 (0.56) 
    
High level of insider ownership for acquirer? 2.636 -2.955 (0.69) 
    
High level of institutional ownership for acquirer? 4.738 2.783 (0.26) 
    
Panel B: Value-Weighted Results    
 
Yes No 
t-stat for 
Difference 
    
Large Acquirer? 7.752 26.400 (2.70)c 
    
High relative size of bidder to target? 19.764 14.186 (0.80) 
    
High acquirer B/M ratio (Value acquirer)? 15.414 18.609 (0.46) 
    
Diversifying acquisition? 7.746 24.089 (2.34)b 
    
Equity consideration given? 12.070 25.033 (1.91)c 
    
Deal structured as a tender offer? 19.519 15.972 (0.51) 
    
High level of incentive compensation for acquirer? 18.384 15.589 (0.40) 
    
High level of insider ownership for acquirer? 15.993 13.963 (0.25) 
    
High level of institutional ownership for acquirer? 19.147 18.291 (0.12) 
    
 
a,b,c Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively 
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Table 9 
Multivariate Regressions of Long-Run Abnormal Returns. 
 
Long-run (60-month) abnormal returns are regressed on a set of governance variables and controls.  
Abnormal returns are calculated as the cumulative market-adjusted return on a monthly basis using the 
CRSP value-weighted index including all distributions.  Total Assets is the book value of the firm’s assets as 
of the most recent Compustat listing.  RelSize is the size of the target relative to that of the acquirer.  B/M is 
the book to market ratio of the acquirer.  Diversify is an indicator variable equal to one if acquirer and target 
have different two-digit SIC codes.  Stock is an indicator equal to one if the acquirer used equity as all or as 
a portion of the consideration.  Tend is an indicator equal to one if the deal is structured as a tender offer.   
Governance variables include Comp defined as the percentage of CEO compensation consisting of equity 
incentives during the twelve months prior to the merger announcement.  InsideOwn is the percentage 
ownership of all officers and directors as reported by Compact Disclosure within twelve months prior to 
the announcement of the merger.  InstOwn is the percentage ownership of institutional investors as 
reported by 13-F filings to the SEC in the twelve months prior to the announcement.  T-statistics are in 
parentheses. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 42.009 -22.131 31.333 52.258 24.725 12.821
(4.00) c (-0.68) (2.65) c (4.09) c (0.91) (0.36)
Total Assets -0.001 -0.001 -0.0001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(-1.26) (-0.73) (-1.46) (-1.32) (-0.33) (-0.88)
RelSize -11.777 -10.761 -14.280 -16.323 -19.097
(-0.73) (-0.67) (-0.68) (-0.94) (-0.84)
B/M 3.853 6.626 -2.093 -2.602 -2.113
(0.27) (0.46) (-0.12) (-0.16) (-0.11)
Diversify -17.169 -17.559 -20.238 -18.398 -18.528
(-2.45) b (-2.52) b (-2.49) b (-2.46) b (-2.12) b
Stock -19.430 -19.588 -22.661 -23.371 -22.354
(-1.99) b (-2.01) b (-2.05) b (-2.23) b (-1.84) a
Tend -9.038 -8.601 -9.038 -15.148 -13.366
(-0.87) (-0.83) (-0.78) (-1.37) (-1.07)
Comp 30.126 21.423 26.184
(2.03) b (1.93) a (1.73) a
InsideOwn -1.114 -1.182 -1.279
(-1.17) (-1.35) (-1.34)
InsideOwnSq 0.010 0.014 0.015
(0.52) (0.81) (0.79)
InstOwn 1.283 0.326 0.998
(1.22) (0.38) (0.95)
InstOwnSq -0.011 0.001 -0.007
(-1.20) (0.11) (-0.83)
N 484 345 484 390 429 345
Adj R2 0.0126 0.0131 0.0182 0.0179 0.0167 0.0246
 
 
a,b,c Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively 
  
61
 
 
 
 
with those of Megginson, Morgan and Nail (2003) in which they report that the main 
contributors to post-merger success are corporate focus and the use of cash as the 
method of payment.  Also consistent with Megginson, Morgan and Nail (2003) (and 
inconsistent with the findings of Rau and Vermaelen (1998)) is the inability of the 
value/glamour effect to explain any of the cross-section of long-run returns.  Tend, 
RelSize and TotalAssets also do not provide any additional explanation for the 
variation in 60-month CARs. 
 When compared to the results for the initial market reaction in table 5, the 
results for Diversify and Stock are even more interesting.  For the cross-sectional 
explanation of the initial market reaction, Diversify had no explanatory power in any of 
the regression specifications.  But in the explanation of long-run return variation it has a 
great deal of explanatory power.  Investors therefore appear to not only initially 
misprice this long-run drift, they also fail to incorporate the information at all.  The 
potential implication for market efficiency regarding stock deals is somewhat less 
worrisome.  The market correctly reacts (negatively) to news of an acquisition using 
equity, but investors appear to underreact to this news.  Use of equity continues to 
impact returns on a long horizon. 
 With regard to the three governance measures used in the multivariate analysis, 
incentive executive compensation (Comp) appears to be a determinant of long-run post-
merger success.  The positive coefficient on Comp of 26.184 (t=1.73) in specification (6) 
is marginally significant and is as strong and even more significant in the alternate 
regressions reported.  Intuitively, this positive and significant coefficient suggests that 
CEOs who are compensated more heavily on an equity incentive basis in the twelve 
months prior to a merger announcement complete deals that perform abnormally well 
on a long-term horizon.  InsideOwn, InstOwn and their respective squares do not 
explain any of the cross-sectional variation in long-run stock returns.  Given the 
potential non-linearity in the effects of these two variables, their inability to explain 
long-run CARs is not very surprising. 
 The positive impact of incentive compensation on long-run post-merger 
performance is somewhat puzzling given the results of table 5.  Firms with higher levels 
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of incentive compensation appear to have a lower initial stock price response than firms 
whose CEOs are not compensated as heavily via incentive equity, yet high levels of 
CEO incentives are typically associated with firms that do better after merger 
completion. 
 As an alternative to the examination of each individual governance mechanism, 
I again use the governance index, G, in an effort to gauge the overall impact of 
governance on long-run returns.  Because of data availability, I also include GIM from 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) in an analysis of shareholder friendly corporate 
charter provisions to gauge their impact on post-merger success.  Essentially, I use the 
same procedure on the 60-month horizon that I used on the announcement day returns.  
The results of this alternative are presented in table 10.  The comparable short-term 
results were presented in table 6.   
 Neither G nor GIM appears to explain any portion of the variation in long-run 
CARs.  To ensure the impact of governance is not somehow clouded by the 
overwhelming influence of Diversify and Stock, I also include interactions of these two 
variables with G and GIM.  Even with the interaction terms included, the indices do not 
contribute to the explanatory power of the regression. 
 Since the results presented here confirm those of previous research of 
diversification and use of equity in corporate control activity, I next ask if there is some 
underlying difference in the governance characteristics of firms who chose to diversify 
and those that do not and of firms that use equity and firms that do not.  Table 11 
reports the results.  Panel A shows that there does not appear to be a substantial 
difference in the governance structures of firms that diversify versus those that do not.  
The only evidence which might suggest that a difference exists is in comparing the 
median level of insider ownership.  Firms in the sample that chose to diversify have a 
lower median level of insider ownership than firms that chose not to.  Panel B of table 
11 extends the analysis to stock deals.  Contrary to the median results on diversification 
in panel A, firms that complete stock deals have a higher mean level of insider 
ownership than those that do not use equity.  Also, firms that chose to do stock deals 
have higher mean and median levels of institutional ownership.  Since the combination  
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Table 10 
Alternative Long-Run Abnormal Return Regression Specifications. 
 
Long-run (60-month) abnormal returns are regressed on a set of governance variables and controls.  
Abnormal returns are calculated as the cumulative market-adjusted return on a monthly basis using the 
CRSP value-weighted index including all distributions.  Total Assets is the book value of the firm’s assets as 
of the most recent Compustat listing.  RelSize is the size of the target relative to that of the acquirer.  B/M is 
the book to market ratio of the acquirer.  Diversify is an indicator variable equal to one if acquirer and target 
have different two-digit SIC codes.  Stock is an indicator equal to one if the acquirer used equity as all or as 
a portion of the consideration.  Tend is an dummy equal to one if the deal is structured as a tender offer.  G 
is a governance index constructed using the governance characteristics of high or low levels of equity 
incentive compensation, insider ownership and institutional ownership.  GIM is the index of Gompers, Ishii 
and Metrick (2003) if available within the twelve months prior to the announcement.  T-stats are in 
parentheses. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 46.017 40.333 27.818 60.989
(2.97) c (2.13) b (1.81) a (2.50) b
Total Assets -0.000 -0.000 -0.0001 -0.001
(-0.19) (-0.21) (-1.61) (-1.76) b
RelSize -21.229 -19.591 -22.274 -25.888
(-0.95) (-0.87) (-1.32) (-1.53)
B/M -6.406 -6.835 15.647 16.493
(-0.34) (-0.37) (1.06) (1.12)
Diversify -17.110 5.157 -12.303 -17.638
(-1.95) a (0.28) (-1.79) b (-0.76)
Stock -24.873 -30.832 -9.784 -59.241
(-2.07) b (-1.58) (-1.04) (-2.41) b
Tend -13.606 -13.262 -3.179 -3.694
(-0.87) (-1.05) (-0.32) (-0.37)
G 2.200 5.463
(0.42) (0.57)
G*Diversify -14.511
(-1.39)
G*Stock 3.865
(0.37)
GIM 0.650 -2.825
(0.54) (-1.21)
GIM*Diversify 0.724
(0.30)
GIM*Stock 5.302
(2.81) b
N 345 345 364 364
Adj R2 0.0097 0.0108 0.0074 0.0150
 
 
a,b,c Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively 
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Table 11 
Univariate Relation Between Governance and Deal Characteristics. 
 
Univariate relation between governance characteristics of sample firms involved in diversifying versus 
focusing deals, equity versus non-equity deals and the intersection of the two.  Comp defined as the 
percentage of CEO compensation consisting of equity incentives during the twelve months prior to the 
merger announcement.  InsideOwn is the percentage ownership of all officers and directors as reported by 
Compact Disclosure within twelve months prior to the announcement of the merger.  InstOwn is the 
percentage ownership of institutional investors as reported by 13-F filings to the SEC in the twelve months 
prior to the announcement.   
 
Panel A: Diversifying vs. Focusing Deals 
       
 Diversify N Mean t(Diff) Median Z(Diff) 
       
Comp 0 274 0.4689  0.5550  
Comp 1 210 0.4831  0.5156  
   Difference   -0.0140 (-0.50) 0.0394 (0.73) 
       
InsideOwn 0 225 0.0850  0.0328  
InsideOwn 1 165 0.0739  0.0192  
   Difference   0.0110 (0.89) 0.0136 (2.97)a 
       
InstOwn 0 244 0.6279  0.6464  
InstOwn 1 185 0.6536  0.6874  
   Difference   -0.0257 (-1.39) -0.0410 (-1.57) 
       
Panel B: Equity vs. Non-Equity Deals 
       
 Stock N Mean t(Diff) Median Z(Diff) 
       
Comp 0 184 0.4602  0.4906  
Comp 1 300 0.4842  0.5555  
   Difference   -0.0240 (-0.81) -0.0649 (1.12) 
       
InsideOwn 0 154 0.0666  0.0236  
InsideOwn 1 236 0.0892  0.0263  
   Difference   -0.0226 (-1.95)c -0.0027 (0.21) 
       
InstOwn 0 168 0.6184  0.6237  
InstOwn 1 261 0.6522  0.6901  
   Difference   -0.0338 (-1.81)c -0.0664 (-2.87)a 
       
Panel C: Diversifying & Equity vs. Focusing & Non-Equity 
       
 
Diversify 
& Stock N Mean t(Diff) Median Z(Diff) 
       
Comp 0 361 0.4720  0.5392  
Comp 1 123 0.4842  0.5397  
   Difference   -0.0120 (-0.37) -0.0005 (-0.10) 
       
InsideOwn 0 296 0.0776  0.0278  
InsideOwn 1 94 0.0887  0.0193  
   Difference   -0.0111 (-0.67) 0.0085 (1.89)c 
       
InstOwn 0 324 0.6331  0.6522  
InstOwn 1 105 0.6571  0.7027  
   Difference   -0.0240 (-1.13) -0.0505 (-2.02)b 
       
a,b,c Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively 
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of panels A and B do not appear to offer a clear picture, panel C reports the governance 
levels for firms completing diversifying deals using equity (double whammy “bad 
deals”) versus those that do focusing deals without equity (“not-bad deals”).  The mean 
values of the governance characteristics are not revealing, however, the median level 
insider ownership for “bad deals” is significantly lower than the median level of insider 
ownership for the “not-bad deals”.   
The median level of institutional ownership for “bad deals” is lower than the 
median level of institutional ownership for acquirers in “not-bad deals”.  Although 
these results are interesting in their own right, the conclusion I draw from this 
additional analysis is that there is not a clear difference in the governance characteristics 
of firms in diversifying or equity deals that could be clouding the multivariate results.   
 Finally, table 12 provides a list of robustness tests performed on the multivariate 
analysis.  In general, the multivariate results are more sensitive to changes in the 
dependent variables than they are to changes in the 60-month CAR metric.  Alternatives 
to the left hand side metric include use of the shorter 12 and 36-month horizons and use 
of the EW market portfolio as opposed to the VW results reported.  Very little variation 
in the results was observed when these changes were made.  When the market-adjusted 
returns were compounded as a BHAR, the lower power of the statistic resulted in 
weaker results for all specifications of the dependent variable.  This power was even 
lower when an in-sample alpha from the Carhart (1997) four-factor model was used in 
the regression.  Finally, the 60-month CARs were normalized by the number of returns 
used in the CAR calculation to account for the fact that all firms did not have a full 60 
months worth of returns data.  No material impact on the results was noted. 
 The results are less robust to changes in the right hand side of the equation.  
When indicators are used in lieu of the absolute levels of the governance variables, the 
large number of indicators appears to confuse the coefficients and subsequently the 
inferences.  Use of market equity in place of total assets to control for firm size has no 
material impact.  A univariate correlation matrix of dependant variables indicates that 
multicollinearity is not a problem.  In an effort to further examine the differences 
between the governance structures of diversifying versus focusing deals and equity 
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versus non-equity deals, regressions are conducted on subsamples of diversifying 
acquirers, focusing acquirers, equity acquirers and non-equity acquirers.  No 
discernable pattern emerges.  Use of heteroskedastic and autocorrelated robust 
estimates weakens the statistical significance of the multivariate coefficients somewhat, 
but the general pattern of the results remained unchanged. 
To summarize, the market reacts negatively to an acquirer’s announcement of a 
merger.  On average, that reaction is more negative for firms with “good governance.”  
There is some calendar-time evidence of abnormal performance on a risk adjusted basis; 
however, when compared to a control group, abnormal performance is limited to large 
glamour acquirers on a 12-month horizon, large cash acquirers on a 36 and 60-month 
horizon and smaller focusing acquirers on a 60-month horizon.  Multivariate analysis of 
long-run returns also reveals that equity as a method of payment and corporate 
diversification are associated with lower post-merger performance.  There is also 
evidence that suggests higher levels of incentive compensation for CEOs is associated 
with more successful merger transactions for long-term investors. 
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Table 12 
Robustness of Multivariate Regressions. 
 
The following robustness checks were conducted of the multivariate regressions performed in 
table 9.  In the results reported in table 9, 60-month abnormal returns were regressed on 
variables hypothesized to explain the cross-sectional variation in long-run performance of 
acquiring firms.  Abnormal returns were calculated as the value-weighted market-adjusted 
return on a monthly basis compounded for 60 months. 
 
Panel A: Robustness Checks for the Dependent Variable 
 
1. Abnormal returns were calculated on 12- and 36-month horizons 
2. Equally-weighted market returns were used as benchmarks 
3. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns were used instead of cumulative abnormal returns. 
4. Alphas from the Carhart (1997) four-factor model were estimated in a time-series 
regression for each individual acquirer during the post-merger period. 
5. Abnormal returns were normalized to account for right censoring of the returns data at 
year end 2001. 
 
 
Panel B: Robustness Checks for the Independent Variables 
 
1. As an alternative to the values associated with the governance characteristics, indicator 
variables were used in lieu of each governance variable to indicate whether or not an 
acquirer had a high or low value for the characteristic. 
2. Market equity was used in lieu of book value of assets to control for size.  This had no 
material impact on the results. 
3. Correlations between independent variables indicate that multicollinearity is not an 
issue in the multivariate regression. 
4. Multivariate regressions were calculated on the subsamples of deals that are 
diversifying, focusing, use equity and use no equity.   
5. Outlying observations do not appear to plague the results.  I employed the experimental 
RobustReg procedure in SAS Release 9.0, and the results remain qualitatively 
unchanged. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
Decades of research has attempted to establish whether or not merging firms 
create or destroy value for the shareholders of both the acquirer and the target in 
merger transactions.  Concurrent research has attempted to determine whether or not 
the stock price response and performance after the merger are in keeping with the 
auspices of market efficiency.  This paper combines the developments in this literature 
with the notion that better governed firms should make better investment decisions.   
As the asset pricing literature has evolved over the years, corporate researchers 
have applied changing asset pricing models to the periods surrounding a corporate 
control event.  The outcome has been as many different sets of results as there have 
been sets of methodologies.  As Fama (1998) notes, it is difficult to establish the 
existence or absence of abnormal performance without first objectively identifying 
“normal” performance.   
While this paper examines the question of market efficiency in and around a 
merger transaction, its main contribution is establishing a relation between acquirer 
governance structure prior to a merger announcement and the stock price response to 
that announcement in both the short and long-run (with emphasis on the long run).  If 
governance mechanisms serve to appropriately align the interests of shareholders and 
managers, then firms with better governance structures should make investment 
decisions (undertake mergers) that maximize shareholder value.  I examine three 
governance mechanisms that could impact the decision to merge: the proportion of 
equity incentive compensation received by the CEO in the twelve months prior to the 
announcement, the level of officer and director ownership in the twelve months prior to 
the announcement and the level of institutional ownership in the twelve months 
immediately prior to the initial news release.  I also incorporate a governance index 
which is a linear function of the three.  Specifically, the index takes a value of zero if the 
acquirer has low levels of all three mechanisms, and the index takes a value of three if it 
has high levels of all three.  Finally, I incorporate the governance index of Gompers, 
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Ishii and Metrick (2003) to examine whether or not shareholder-friendly corporate 
charter provisions impact the success or failure of a merger for investors of the acquirer. 
I collect a sample of acquisitions from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) 
Mergers and Acquisitions Database.  I impose data requirements from both CRSP and 
Compustat as well as compensation data from Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp 
Database.  Finally, I eliminate financial institutions and regulated utilities.  The result is 
a sample of 484 acquisitions completed between January 1, 1993, and December 31, 
2000.  I collect additional governance data on these 484 firms from the Compact 
Disclosure CD-ROM. 
In order to test the proposition that governance influences merger performance, 
I use a myriad of methodologies.  First, I conduct a standard event study for merger 
announcements and examine whether or not this announcement is different for firms 
with high versus low values of the governance variables.  Next, I conduct a multivariate 
regression of the announcement day returns on the governance mechanisms and 
controls.  I then form equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolios in calendar time 
in a test of market efficiency on a 12 to 60-month horizon.  I also test for differences 
between the alphas of each of the subsamples of interest.  Finally, I conduct multivariate 
regressions of long-run returns on the governance variables and a set of controls. 
 
Here is a summary of the results: 
1.   The mean announcement day abnormal return for the full sample of 
acquirers is a significant -1.02% (t=-4.62). 
2.  The only significant difference in mean abnormal returns on a univariate 
basis is observed between the groups of acquirers that have low and high levels of 
institutional ownership.  The reaction to these two groups differs by 1.34% (t=2.84) with 
the group of high institutional ownership acquirers having a more negative stock price 
response. 
3.  Multivariate regressions to describe the initial market response indicate that 
governance is a significant factor.  A linear governance index comprised of the three 
measures loads negatively when included in an explanatory regression.  When included 
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by themselves, Comp (an indicator equal to one if the CEO is compensated more 
heavily on an equity incentive basis) and the square of InstOwn (the percentage of 
institutional ownership) load negatively in the specification.  Although statistically 
significant, the square of InstOwn is not economically meaningful. 
4.  Additional variables with explanatory power in the cross-section of 
announcement returns include Stock (an indicator equal to one if equity is used as 
consideration in the deal) and Tend (an indicator equal to one for a deal structured as a 
tender offer).  Each has a significantly negative influence on the initial market reaction.    
5.  In calendar-time, there is evidence of long-term overperformance on a 12, 36 
and 60-month for the largest of the acquirers in the sample.   
6. There exists a discrepancy in the inferences one can make regarding the 
performance of portfolios that are equally-weighted versus those that are value-
weighted in calendar-time. 
7.  In calendar-time, the choice of long-term horizon (12, 36 or 60-months) has a 
substantial impact on the conclusions I (and other researchers) are able to make 
regarding abnormal performance of subsamples. 
8.  Multivariate regressions of 60-month CARs on the governance variables and 
controls indicate that corporate focus, method of payment and incentive CEO 
compensation have explanatory power.  A dummy identifying diversifying deals loads 
negatively; as does a dummy identifying deals involving stock as a method of payment.  
The coefficient estimate on Comp is positive and significant indicating that CEOs with 
increased equity incentives find deals that create long-term shareholder value. 
9.  Acquirers that undertake deals involving equity or diversifying deals (or 
both) do not appear to have significantly different governance structures than those 
that do not. 
10.  The results are relatively robust to an exhaustive list of reasonable 
alterations to the methodology. 
 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) were the first researchers to report that a 
firm’s corporate governance appears to influence long-run stock returns.  They find that 
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firms with a greater number of “shareholder-friendly” corporate charter provisions 
outperform firms with less “shareholder-friendly” provisions on a long-term horizon.  
In this regard, perhaps it is not surprising to discover that additional governance 
measures influence stock returns around certain corporate news events.  However, as 
far as I am able to determine, this paper is the first evidence that supports the notion 
that if you compensate a CEO via a greater percentage of incentives, then he or she 
finds deals that create more value for shareholders on a longer horizon. 
A logical extension to this research is the incorporation of a variable that 
captures the level of independence of the acquirer’s board of directors.  The board of 
directors serves as shareholder representatives and has the express responsibility of 
monitoring management.  As such, it is entirely possible for the board of directors to 
have an influence on the success or failure of a merger.  Additionally, an examination of 
post-merger operating performance would perhaps reveal ways in which governance 
effects the merger that this paper does not capture.  There is no doubt that other 
research avenues exist with regard to the topic of mergers and governance. 
  
72
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Agrawal, A., Jaffe, J., Mandelker, G.N., 1992, The post-merger performance of acquiring 
firms: a re-examination of an anomaly.  Journal of Finance 47, 1605-1621. 
 
Agrawal, A., Mandelker, G.N., 1987, Managerial incentives and corporate investment 
and financing decisions.  Journal of Finance 42, 823-837. 
 
Andrade, G., Mitchell, M., Stafford, E., 2001, New evidence and perspectives on 
mergers.  Journal of Economic Perspectives 15, 103-120. 
 
Asquith, P., 1983, Merger bids, uncertainty, and stockholder returns.  Journal of 
Financial Economics 11, 51-83. 
 
Barber, B.M., Lyon, J.D., 1997, Detecting long-run abnormal stock returns: the empirical 
power and specification of test statistics.  Journal of Financial Economics 42, 341-
372. 
 
Black, F., 1972, Capital market equilibrium with restricted borrowing. Journal of 
Business 45, 444-455. 
 
Bliss, R.T., Rosen, R.J., 2001, CEO compensation and bank mergers.  Journal of Financial 
Economics 61, 107-138. 
 
Brickley, J.A., Lease, R.C., Smith, C.W., 1988, Ownership structure and voting on 
antitakeover amendments.  Journal of Financial Economics 20, 267-291. 
 
Brown, S.J., Warner, J.B., 1985, Using daily stock returns: the case of event studies. 
Journal of Financial Economics 14, 3-31. 
 
Byrd, J.W., Hickman, K.A., 1992, Do outside directors monitor managers? Evidence 
from tender offer bids. Journal of Financial Economics 32, 195-221. 
 
Byrd, J.W., Parrino, R., Pritsch, G., 1998, Stockholder-manager conflicts and firm value.  
Financial Analysts Journal 54, 14-30. 
 
Carhart, M.M., 1997, On persistence in mutual fund performance.  Journal of Finance 
52, 57-82. 
 
Cotter, J.F., Shivdasani, A., Zenner, M., 1997, Do independent directors enhance target 
shareholder wealth during tender offers?  Journal of Financial Economics 43, 195-
218. 
 
  
73
 
 
 
 
Dimson, E., Marsh, P., 1986, Event study methodologies and the size effect. Journal of 
Financial Economics 17, 113-142. 
 
Fama, E.F., 1998, Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance.  Journal 
of Financial Economics 49, 283-306. 
 
Fama, E.F., French, K.R., 1993, Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds.  
Journal of Financial Economics 33, 3-56. 
 
Franks, J., Harris, R., Titman, S., 1991, The postmerger share-price performance of 
acquiring firms.  Journal of Financial Economics 29, 81-96. 
 
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., Metrick, A., 2003, Corporate governance and equity prices.  
Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 107-155. 
 
Gompers, P., Metrick, A., 2001, Institutional investors and equity prices.  Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 116, 229-259. 
 
Gregory, A., 1997, An examination of the long run performance of U.K. acquiring firms.   
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 24, 971-1002. 
 
Hall, B., Liebman, J., 1998, Are CEOs really paid like bureaucrats?  Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 113, 653-691. 
 
Hall, B., Liebman, J., 2000, The taxation of executive compensation, Unpublished 
working paper, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Harford, J., 1999, Corporate cash reserves and acquisitions.  Journal of Finance 54, 1969-
1997. 
 
Hogarty, T., 1970, The profitability of corporate mergers, Journal of Business 43, 317-
327. 
 
Holderness C., Kroszner, R., Sheehan, D., 1999, Were the good old days that good? 
Changes in managerial stock ownership since the great depression.  Journal of 
Finance 54, 435-470. 
 
Holstrom, B., Kaplan, S.N., 2001, Corporate governance and merger activity in the 
United States: making sense of the 1980s and 1990s.  Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 15, 121-144. 
 
Holstrom, B., Kaplan, S.N., 2003, The state of U.S. corporate governance: what’s right 
and what’s wrong? Unpublished working paper,  National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
  
74
 
 
 
 
 
Huson, M.R., Parrino, R., Starks, L.T., 2001, Internal monitoring mechanisms and CEO 
turnover: a long-term perspective.  Journal of Finance 56, 2265-2297. 
 
Ikenberry, D., Lakonishok, J., Vermaelen, T., 1995, Market underreaction to open 
market share repurchases.  Journal of Financial Economics 39, 181-208. 
 
Jaffe, J.F., 1974, Special information and insider trading.  Journal of Business 47, 410-428. 
 
Jensen, M.C., 1986, Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. 
American Economic Review 76, 323-329. 
 
Jensen, M.C., 1988, Takeovers: their causes and consequences.  Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 2, 21-48. 
 
Jensen, M.C., 1993, The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal 
control systems.  Journal of Finance 48, 831-880. 
 
Jensen, M.C., Meckling, W.H., 1976, Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency 
costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360.  
 
Jensen, M.C., Murphy, K.J., 1990, Performance pay and top-management incentives, 
Journal of Political Economy 98, 225-264. 
 
Jensen, M.C., Ruback, R.S., 1983, The market for corporate control: the scientific 
evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 11, 5-50. 
 
Kothari, S.P., Warner, J.B., 1997, Measuring long-horizon security price performance.  
Journal of Financial Economics 43, 301-339. 
 
Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1994, Contrarian investment, extrapolation, 
and risk.  Journal of Finance 49, 1541-1578. 
 
Langetieg, T.C., 1978. An application of a three-factor performance index to measure 
stockholder gains from merger.  Journal of Financial Economics 6, 365-383. 
 
Lewellen, W., Loderer, C., Rosenfeld, A., 1985, Merger decisions and executive stock 
ownership in acquiring firms.  Journal of Accounting and Economics 7, 209-231. 
 
Lintner, J., 1965, The valuation of risk assets and the selection of risky investments in 
stock portfolios and capital budgets.  The Review of Economics and Statistics 47, 13-
37. 
 
  
75
 
 
 
 
Loughran, T., Vijh, A.M., 1997, Do long-term shareholders benefit from corporate 
acquisitions?  Journal of Finance 52, 1765-1790. 
 
Lyon, J.D., Barber, B.M., Tsai, C.L., 1999, Improved methods for tests of long-run 
abnormal stock returns.  Journal of Finance 54, 165-201. 
 
Malatesta, P.H., 1983, The wealth effect of merger activity and the objective functions of 
merging firms. Journal of Financial Economics 11, 155-181. 
 
Mandelker, G., 1974, Risk and return: the case of merging firms.  Journal of Financial 
Economics 1, 303-335. 
 
Masulis, R., 1980, The effects of capital structure changes on security prices: a study of 
exchange offers.  Journal of Financial Economics 8, 139-177. 
 
McConnell, J.J., Servaes, H., 1990, Additional evidence on equity ownership and 
corporate value. Journal of Financial Economics 27, 595-612. 
 
Megginson, W.L., Morgan, A., Nail, L., 2003, The determinants of positive long-term 
performance in strategic mergers: corporate focus and cash. Unpublished working 
paper, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK. 
 
Mitchell, M.L., Mulherin, J.H., 1996, The impact of industry shocks on takeover and 
restructuring activity.  Journal of Financial Economics 41, 193-229. 
 
Mitchell, M.L., Stafford, E., 2000, Managerial decisions and long-term stock price 
performance.  Journal of Business 73, 287-329. 
 
Modigliani, F., Miller, M., 1958, The cost of capital, corporation finance, and the theory 
of investment. American Economic Review 48, 261-297. 
 
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1988, Management ownership and market 
valuation: an empirical analysis.  Journal of Financial Economics 20, 293-315. 
 
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1990, Do managerial objectives drive bad 
acquisitions? Journal of Finance 45, 31-48. 
 
Myers, S.C., Majluf, N.S., 1984, Corporate financing and investment decisions when 
firms have information that investors do not have.  Journal of Financial Economics 
13, 187-221. 
 
Opler, T., Pinkowitz, L., Stulz, R., Williamson, R., 1999, The determinants and 
implications of corporate cash holdings.  Journal of Financial Economics 52, 3-46. 
 
  
76
 
 
 
 
Pound, J., 1988, Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight.  Journal of 
Financial Economics 20, 237-265. 
 
Rau, R.P., Vermaelen, T., 1998, Glamour, value and the post-acquisition performance of 
acquiring firms.  Journal of Financial Economics 49, 223-253. 
 
Roll, R., 1977, A critique of the asset pricing theory’s tests; Part 1: On past and potential 
testability of the theory, Journal of Financial Economics 4, 129-176. 
 
Roll, R., 1986, The hubris hypothesis of takeovers.  Journal of Business 59, 197-216. 
 
Ross, S.A., 1976, The arbitrage theory of capital asset pricing, Journal of Economic 
Theory 13, 341-360.  
 
Sharpe, W.F., 1964, Capital asset prices: a theory of market equilibrium under 
conditions of risk.  Journal of Finance 19, 425-442. 
 
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1986, Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of 
Political Economy 94, 461-488. 
 
Stulz, R.M., 1988, Managerial control of voting rights, financing policies and the market 
for corporate control.  Journal of Financial Economics 20, 25-54. 
 
Weisbach, M.S., 1988, Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of Financial 
Economics 20, 431-460. 
 
Woidtke, T., 2002, Agents watching agents?: evidence from pension fund ownership 
and firm value. Journal of Financial Economics 63, 99-131. 
 
  
77
 
 
 
 
VITA 
 
Jonathan Paul Breazeale 
 
Parkway Properties, Inc. 3 Guinevere Place 
515 W. Greens Road The Woodlands, TX 77384 
Suite 110 Phone (936) 273-1304 
Houston, TX 77067  
Phone:  (281) 875-0900 
Fax:  (281) 875-1708 Email: jbreazeale@pky.com 
 
 
Current Position:  
 Asset Manager, Parkway Properties, Inc. (NYSE: PKY) Houston, TX 
 Responsible for the asset management of a fifteen building class A office building 
portfolio totaling more than 2.2 million square feet.   
 
 
Education: 
 Texas A&M University – Mays Business School 2004 
 Ph.D. in Finance 
 
 Millsaps College – Else School of Management 1999 
 M.B.A. (Concentration in Finance) 
 
 United States Military Academy 1995 
 B.S. – Engineering Physics (Concentration in Nuclear Engineering) 
 
 
Teaching Experience: 
Texas A&M University – Mays Business School 
 Instructor: 
 FINC 635 – Financial Management for Non-Business 2003 
 FINC 434 – Managerial Finance I 2002 
 Teaching Assistant: 
 FINC 690 – Theory of Research in Finance 2003 
 FINC 629 – Managerial Finance I 2003 
 FINC 435 & 630 – Managerial Finance II (Case Studies) 2003 
 FINC 612 – Finance for the Professional (Core M.B.A.) 2001-2002 
 FINC 689 – Special Topics in Corporate Finance 2000 
 
 
Previous Work Experience: 
 Parkway Properties, Inc. (NYSE: PKY) 1998-2000 
 United States Army – First Lieutenant 1995-1998 
